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ABSTRACT
Categorization of Security Design Patterns
by
Jeremiah Dangler
Strategies for software development often slight security-related considerations, due to the
difficulty of developing realizable requirements, identifying and applying appropriate tech-
niques, and teaching secure design. This work describes a three-part strategy for addressing
these concerns. Part 1 provides detailed questions, derived from a two-level characterization
of system security based on work by Chung et. al., to elicit precise requirements. Part 2
uses a novel framework for relating this characterization to previously published strategies,
or patterns, for secure software development. Included case studies suggest the framework’s
effectiveness, involving the application of three patterns for secure design (Limited View,
Role-Based Access Control, Secure State Machine) to a production system for document
management. Part 3 presents teaching modules to introduce patterns into lower-division
computer science courses. Five modules, integer overflow, input validation, HTTPS, files
access, and SQL injection, are proposed for conveying an aware of security patterns and
their value in software development.
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Security in software engineering has become an important research area, in part because
of recent events that exposed security vulnerabilities in major systems. Modern enterprises
store large amounts of sensitive and confidential information in information systems. This
information must be protected from unauthorized access and modification to assure its value
and to protect those who would be harmed by its disclosure or alteration.
Numerous incidents attest to how breaches of policy can result in lost data or financial
loss. Siemens, a German-based international corporation, had its operations control system
attacked by a highly sophisticated virus, called Stuxnet, which wreaked havoc on systems.
[14] In early 2011, the Stuxnet virus “is thought to have caused severe damage to Iranian
uranium” centrifuges, possibly setting back the nation’s nuclear power policies. [13] Another
highly publicized breach involved an April 2011 compromise of Sony’s PlayStation Network
(PSN). Sony reported that information such as a user’s name, address, email, birthday and
PSN online ID were stolen along with the possibility of credit cards associated with the
user’s account. [18]
Enterprises use security policies to define how a system should be accessed, who can access
it, and when it can be accessed. These requirements for system security are often treated as
non-functional requirements (NFRs) for system implementation. NFRs, which describe how
a system should perform, address concerns such as operational costs, reliability, and system
robustness. These types of requirements are often not formulated until after a system is
under development. [3] This is due, in part, to the difficulty of soliciting and documenting
NFRs. Unfortunately, delaying the formulation of security NFRs can lead to incomplete,
inappropriate, or inadequately realized requirements, leaving the resulting system vulnerable
to the theft of sensitive data and loss of service. [8]
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To meet security NFRs, better methods for soliciting and documenting security quality
attributes are needed. Soliciting NFRs early in the system development process should
promote the development of well documented specifications. These specifications would then
be more likely to be captured in a system’s design. The likelihood of their being realized
effectively could be further increased through good design practices, including the use of
well-documented design patterns for secure design. Design patterns are reusable solutions to
common problems that occur in software development. They include security design pattern,
a type of pattern that addresses problems associated with security NFRs.
This thesis is concerned with strategies for promoting the integration of security NFRs
into software development. To this end, it first presents a method of classifying security
issues using a hierarchical structure (cf. Chapter 2). This hierarchy decomposes security,
a broad-based concern, into multiple, smaller concerns that should be easier to translate
into precise specifications. To aid in this translation, a series of simple, focused questions
has been developed for identifying a system’s quality attributes, relative to this hierarchy.
Answers to the questions are documented as security NFRs.
This hierarchy of security-related issues is then used to categorize 30 security design
patterns that can be used to satisfy security NFRs (cf. Chapter 3). This catalogue includes
a short description of the pattern, a characterization of the specific NFR with which each
pattern is concerned, the stage of the software development life cycle in which each should
be applied, and a reference to a more complete description of that pattern. This material is
intended to provide designers with a way to easily identify the pattern that applies to their
security concern.
To assess its effectiveness as a tool for secure software design, this catalogue was then used
as the basis for a case study related to improving the design of a production software system
(cf. Chapter 4). This system, the Online Tenure and Promotion System (OLTP), manages
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documents and other artifacts for East Tennessee State University’s (ETSU) tenure and pro-
motion process. This is a year-long process whose requirements include multiple checkpoints
for generating and freezing documentation, reasonably complex criteria for determining when
these checkpoints are met, and the need to allow selected participants to assume multiple
roles: e.g., as committee member and unit head. This case study demonstrates the effective-
ness of using patterns to simplify maintenance as well as the need to apply multiple patterns
to a system to achieve the desired level of quality.
A final concern, the need to educate students about the value of these patterns, was
addressed by developing modules on security that can be integrated into a standard com-
puting curriculum (cf. Chapter 5). Introducing topics as the student progresses through the
curriculum allows these modules to be tailored to a student’s current skill set, while empha-
sizing the need to consider security in all phases of software development. Five modules for
freshman and sophomore level courses are presented here. Topics include integer overflow,
file access, HTTPS, SQL injection, and input validation. Future work will include additional




Security in software systems is the protection of an enterprise’s data against unwanted
access or modification. [4] Security is a diverse challenge that includes practices that range
from escaping user input to protecting against unauthorized access to sensitive information.
Security is traditionally characterized as a non-functional requirement (NFR), a require-
ment for how a system should operate. [8] Security, unfortunately, is often engineered into
systems late in the design process or after implementation. This results in a system that is
less maintainable and less trustworthy in terms of putting an enterprise’s data at risk. [3]
NFRs are often slighted in systems development because their requirements are difficult to
formulate. The strategy for managing security-related NFRs described here first decomposes
security into a hierarchy of more specific NFRs, then relates the decomposed requirements
to a catalogue of best practices for security development. This use of decomposition to
reduce a vague, broad-based NFR to a set of more precise and verifiable requirements is one
that has been discussed at length in the literature of NFRs. [15] The practices for security
assurance that have been catalogued here are ones that are routinely neglected in traditional
systems development, relative to the stages of the development process where they can most
effectively be applied.
The required decomposition of the security NFR was accomplished in two steps. Chung’s
[8] work on NFR decomposition was first used to decompose security into four first-level
properties. One, confidentiality, is the protection of an enterprise’s sensitive data from
unauthorized access. A second, integrity, is the protection of an enterprise’s data from
unauthorized modification. A third, availability, is the protection of an enterprise’s data from
becoming unavailable from authorized users. [8] The fourth, accountability, is the association
of actions that affect the enterprise’s data with the person or persons who perform those
13
actions. [16]. The hierarchy allows software engineers to focus on specific security concerns
and provides a vocabulary to better communicate specific security concerns.
In order to support the development of precise requirements for system security, each of
these properties was then decomposed into a second set of properties. These properties are
confidentiality, integrity, availability, and accountability. This second-level decomposition
proved precise enough to develop a set of detailed questions for eliciting requirements: one
set per property.
A Detailed Characterization of Security NFRS
Chung et al. [8] created a framework for capturing and documenting NFRs. This frame-
work associates every NFR with a particular topic: i.e., a consideration related to system
operation. For example, a topic could be an Account that needs protection from unautho-
rized access or a Service that needs to respond within a specific time. This framework was
used to decompose security, considered as an NFR, into four more specific NFRs: confiden-
tiality, integrity, availability, and accountability.
Requirements for the confidentiality of an enterprise’s data are typically derived from that
enterprise’s security policies as they relate to this data. These requirements, as noted in [8],
can be further decomposed into requirements for user authentication and authorization. Re-
quirements for confidentiality should strongly influence how a system is designed, how access
is controlled, how processes are controlled, and how users are authenticated. Breaches of con-
fidentiality can often be attributed to mistakes in system implementation that are exploited
by malicious parties to gain unauthorized access to the compromised data. An example of a
recent breach in confidentiality occurred in 2011 when hackers infiltrated Sony’s PlayStation
Network resulting in the theft of over 77 million account holders’ personal information. This
breach has cost Sony over $171 million, in terms of lost revenues and costs to secure its
14
networks. [17]
Requirements for the integrity of an enterprise’s data are derived from that enterprise’s
operating policies. Chung et al. [8] cite data’s completeness, precision, and validity as
considerations in assessing its integrity. A fourth concern is timeliness, or the extent to which
a system’s information is current. Policies for data integrity must clearly define who can
modify what data. Data corruption can be attributed in part to the deliberate modifications
to datasets or processes by unauthorized users: for example, the alteration of experimental
data to suggest a desired outcome. This corrupt data, when used by other processes or
systems, can further contaminate other datasets and processes.
Requirements for the availability of an enterprise’s services are derived from that enter-
prise’s quality service policies. Barbacci, for example, notes that “availability is required
for security critical aspects of any given system.” [4] These requirements can be further
decomposed into requirements for usability, reliability, and compatibility. Resources can be
rendered unusable by malicious or inadvertent denial of service attacks: bombardments of
resources with more requests than they can handle. [4]
Requirements for the accountability of an enterprise’s services can be derived from an
enterprise’s policies for employees responsible for their actions. Requirements for account-
ability can be decomposed into requirements for logging, monitoring, and reporting users’
actions. Logging allows the enterprise to determine which user may have breached sys-
tem confidentiality or affected data integrity. For example, medical record systems will log
medical providers who access patient information. This log can be used to determine if a
provider breaches patient confidentiality by accessing records of individuals in ways that are
not allowed by government regulations.
Since this first-level decomposition proved too coarse-grained to use as a basis for de-
veloping questions for requirements elicitation, these four NFRs were decomposed a second
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time. This second round of decomposition and the increased level of complexity that ensued
from it suggested a need for strategies for documenting the decomposition. Chung et al.
[8] suggest two, both of which are used in what follows. One employs a graph that uses
cloud symbols to denote NFRs and lines to represent inter-dependencies. A single line forms
an arch with the subtypes to indicate that the four subtypes should be met to satisfy the
security NFR. An example of the notation with an Account is given in figure 1.
Figure 1: Security NFR Subtypes
The other uses a longhand notation in the form:
confidentiality [Topic] AND integrity [Topic] AND accountability [Topic]
AND availability [Topic] SATIFICE security [Topic]
An example of the notation with an Account would be
confidentiality [Account]
Confidentiality
Using Chung’s method, confidentiality was decomposed into authentication and autho-
rization subtypes (cf. 2). Authentication is the confirming of a user’s or entity’s identity.
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Authorization can be done through physical confirmation, using devices such as biometrics
or key card access, or specialized information like a secure password or a unique authentica-
tion key. Authorization is the granting of access to system resources such as accounts, files,
or processes. Authorization is typically granted after a user has been authenticated. What
resources a user is authorized to use may be stored in an access control list or based on a
user’s role within the system. [8] Figure 2 shows confidentiality decomposed using Chung’s
notation.
authentication [Topic] AND authorization [Topic] SATIFICE confidential-
ity [Topic]
Figure 2: Confidentiality Subtypes
Integrity
Using Chung’s method, integrity was decomposed into completeness, precision, timeli-
ness, and validity subtypes (cf. 3). Completeness is the storing of all information that a
system is required to have. Precision is the degree to which stored information models true
or accepted values. Timeliness is the currency of the system’s information. Validity is the
17
correctness of that information, relative to the entities that it is intended to model. [8]
Figure 3 shows integrity decomposed using Chung’s notation.
completeness [Topic] AND precision [Topic] AND timeliness [Topic] AND
validity [Topic] SATIFICE integrity [Topic]
Figure 3: Integrity Subtypes
Availability
Using Chung’s method, availability was decomposed into usability, reliability, and com-
patibility subtypes (cf. 4). Usability is the amount of time and effort required to use a
program. Reliability is a system’s ability to function in adverse circumstances, including
attacks and component failures. Compatibility is the degree to which a program operates
securely in a given environment. This includes the hiding of sensitive information from users
who are not authorized to have that information. [8] Figure 4 shows availability decomposed
using Chung’s notation.
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usability [Topic] AND reliability [Topic] AND compatibility [Topic] SAT-
IFICE availability [Topic]
Figure 4: Availability Subtypes
Accountability
Using Chung’s method, accountability was decomposed into logging, monitoring, and
reporting subtypes (cf. 5). Logging is the recording of actions performed in or by a software
system. Monitoring is a system’s awareness of actions that may require notification to a
third party. Reporting is the relaying of information to a third party. [8] Figure 5 shows
accountability decomposed using Chung’s notation.
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logging [Topic] AND monitoring [Topic] AND reporting [Topic] SATIFICE
accountability [Topic]
Figure 5: Accountability Subtypes
Soliciting NFRs
This decomposition yielded a list of detailed concerns to address when soliciting a system’s
security requirements, together with a list of sample questions for soliciting them. The
questions below, one of this work’s contributions, should be detailed enough to elicit useful
responses from a system’s stakeholders. Each question was derived from the definition of its
corresponding NFR.
Authentication Should the system authenticate a user before allowing access to the sys-
tem?
Authorization Should the system require a user to be authorized to access data before
allowing the user to access sensitive data?
Completeness For each type of data that a system stores, under what circumstances must
20
that data be stored in full? For those types of data that can sometimes be stored in
part, when is it acceptable to do so? Also, what degree of incompleteness is acceptable?
Precision How precise, in significant digits, should numeric values be stored within a sys-
tem? Should names include middle names?
Timeliness For each type of data that a system presents to its users, under what circum-
stances must the system present the most recent version of that type to its users? For
those types of data for which the system may present an older version of that data,
how old may that version be?
Validity For each type of data that a system stores, under what circumstances may that
data be invalid?
Logging What events that occur within a system, if any, should the system track?
Monitoring For each type of resource that the system supports, should the system provide
monitoring for that resource? And, if so, how timely should the data be?
Reporting To which third parties, if any, should the system report events or other infor-
mation about its operation? What sorts of information should be reported?
Usability Should the system allow users to view functionality that they are not authorized
to use? If so, should they be allowed to access this functionality, then be subjected to
errors when using unauthorized functionality?
Reliability Under what circumstances is it acceptable for a system that is under attack to
be taken oﬄine for any length of time?
Compatibility In what environments (e.g., Linux and Windows) must the system run?
21
The decomposition of security into a hierarchy simplifies the process of soliciting security
NFRs. The following chapter describes a second use for this hierarchy: the classification of




Software design patterns are solutions to problems that arise regularly during software
design. They are meant to serve as readily applicable, time-saving strategies for software
development. The structured documentation that accompanies a properly defined pattern
allows developers to quickly identify and apply patterns to a given problem. [11]
A review of the literature on design patterns conducted for this research from August 2012
to December 2012 yielded 30 patterns that are concerned specifically with secure systems
design. This chapter catalogues patterns identified during the review. These patterns have
been categorized according to whether they’re concerned with a system’s architecture, design,
or implementation. Within these levels, patterns are further categorized as to whether they’re
concerned with the confidentiality, integrity, authorization, or accountability subtypes of the
security NFR, as discussed in chapter 2.
Overview of Design Patterns
The notion of a design pattern was developed by Christopher Alexander in his work on
reusable strategies for architecting space and structure. Alexander’s patterns [1] characterize
what he referred to as “timeless ways of building”: recurring practices in structural compo-
sition. Alexander says, “each pattern describes a problem which occurs over and over again
in our environment, and then describes the core of the solution to that problem, in such a
way that you can use this solution a million times over, without ever doing it the same way
twice”. [1]
In 1987, Beck and Cunningham [5] applied Alexander’s idea of patterns to the develop-
ment of graphical user interfaces in an object-oriented language, Smalltalk. Cunningham and
Beck developed five patterns for developing a Smalltalk user interface. They published their
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results at the OOPSLA-87 workshop. [5] Between 1990 and 1992, Eric Gamma, Ralph John-
son, John Vlissides, and Richard Helm, a.k.a. the Gang of Four (GoF), compiled a catalog of
patterns. These patterns were subsequently published as what became known as the Gang
of Four (GoF) book [11]: the first and highly influential book of software design patterns.
This book was followed by the publication of many subsequent pattern collections, such as
Grady Booch’s Handbook of Software Architecture [6], which currently includes about 2,000
patterns. Patterns are also the theme of a series of worldwide conferences sponsored by the
Pattern Language of Programming group. The conferences’ proceedings are published as
Pattern Languages of Program Design (PLoPD). [7]
According to [11], a software design pattern should consist of four elements. These
elements include a pattern name, a problem described by a set of scenarios, a solution
of how that pattern may be implemented, and a discussion of the consequences of applying
that pattern.
A pattern’s name, according to [11], should describe “a design problem, its solutions,
and consequences” in a few words. Naming a common design strategy gives developers a
common vocabulary that facilitates communication during software development. While a
pattern may be difficult to name, giving a clear name is crucial for communicating that
pattern’s significance.
The problem, a set of scenarios, describes the situations in which the pattern is needed.
This description may restrict when the pattern can be used and how it may be applied.
The solution, a characterization of the pattern’s implementation, describes the design’s
component parts and their responsibilities; how these parts collaborate; and the relation-
ships between the parts. This characterization is an abstract description of how the pattern’s
elements are generally arranged. Since the patterns are not language dependent, the solu-
tion might not give a concrete implementation. Pattern developers often document their
24
patterns using the Unified Modeling Language (UML). This description, however, is often
supplemented with examples in specific languages.
The consequences are the “results and trade-offs” of applying that pattern. Alternative
designs are evaluated to document the costs and benefits of using the pattern.
The literature on design patterns includes interactions between patterns known as pattern
relationships. Buschmann et al. [7] detail three common pattern relationships: pattern
complements, pattern compounds, and pattern sequences.
Pattern complement is providing missing parts or contrasts other patterns by provid-
ing an alternative solution. One example is using the DISPOSAL METHOD, to compliment
the FACTORY METHOD, to manage the creation and destruction of objects in the same
design.
Pattern compound captures repetitive subdomains of common and identifiable pat-
terns that can be viewed as a single decision to a common problem. An example of pattern
compounds is implementing COMMAND as a COMPOSITE, resulting in a cohesive pattern,
COMPOSITE COMMAND.
Pattern sequences are the generalization of a “progression of patterns and the way a
design can be established by joining predecessor patterns” to form an overall solution for a
given context. One example of this is the creation of communication middleware by joining
BROKER, LAYERS, WRAPPER, FACADE, REACTOR, and other patterns. [7]
Patterns can also be aggregated to form pattern languages, a term first used by Christo-
pher Alexander. [1] In the context of software engineering, a pattern language “defines a
collection of patterns and the rules to combine them into an architectural style. Pattern
languages describe software frameworks or families of related systems”. [9] Bushmann et
al. [7] use the term pattern system in place of pattern language. A pattern system defines
a collection of patterns used during architecture design. Included with the design pattern
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are descriptions of how to implement and combine patterns. Pattern systems should help
a software system fulfill both functional and non-functional requirements. According to
Buschmann et al. [7], a collection of patterns must meet five requirements to be a pattern
system:
• Comprise a sufficient base of patterns
• Describe all patterns uniformly
• Expose the various relationships between patterns
• Support the construction of software systems
• Support its own evolution
Security Design Patterns
Security patterns are software design patterns that describe security mechanisms such
as logging and access control. [10] The first use of the term “security patterns” occurred
in 1997 paper by Yoder and Barcalow. [22] Prior to this paper, researchers had published
several models for secure systems but had not referred to them as “patterns”. More recent
work includes books by Schumacher [16] and papers by Viega [21]
The following catalogue of security design patterns could have been presented using the
name, problem, solution, and consequences template for pattern description developed by
the GoF. For brevity, however, the list below provides just an abbreviated description of each
pattern, along with a reference to the pattern’s original source. Patterns have been grouped
by the level of software artifact to which they pertain: i.e., architectural-level patterns,
which specify how large-scale components interact; design-level patterns, which specify how
elements of a single component (e.g.., class) interact; and implementation-level patterns,
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which are applied to low-level security concerns. Within each level, patterns have been
grouped according to the type of second-level NFR to which they apply: i.e., confidentiality,
integrity, availability, or accountability. Classification was initially attempted at the third
level of the NFR tree but was unsuccessful, since patterns tended to apply to several NFRs
at that level. Table 1 gives the patterns ordered alphabetical and table 2 gives the patterns
ordered according to the associated NFR category and Design Level.
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Table 1: Catalog of Security Design Patterns (Alphabetical Order)
Pattern Name NFR Category Design Level Page
Authenticator [16] Confidentiality Design 30
Authorization [16] Confidentiality Design 31
Check Point [22] Confidentiality Design 32
Clear Sensitive Information [10] Confidentiality Implementation 33
Controlled Object Factory [16] Integrity Design 34
Defer to Kernel [10] Confidentiality Architectural 35
Distrustful Decomposition [10] Integrity Architectural 36
Full View with Errors [22] Availability Design 37
Information Obscurity [16] Confidentiality Implementation 38
Input Validation [10] Integrity Implementation 39
Limited View [22] Availability Design 40
Multilevel Security [16] Confidentiality Architectural 40
Pathname Canonicalization [10] Integrity Implementation 42
Privilege Separation [10] Integrity Architectural 43
Resource Acquisition is Initialization (RAII) [10] Availability Implementation 44
Role Rights Definition [16] Confidentiality Architectural 45
Role-Based Access Control [16] Confidentiality Architectural 41
Roles [22] Confidentiality Design 45
Secure Access layer [22] Integrity Architectural 59
Secure Builder Factory [10] Integrity Design 46
Secure Chain of Responsibility [10] Integrity Design 48
Secure Channels Confidentiality Implementation 60
Secure Directory [10] Integrity Implementation 57
Secure Factory [10] Integrity Design 49
Secure Logger [10] Accountability Implementation 51
Secure Session [22] Integrity Design 59
Secure State Machine [10] Confidentiality Design 52
Secure Strategy Factory [10] Integrity Design 53
Secure Visitor [10] Integrity Design 55
Single Access Point [22] Confidentiality Design 57
28
Table 2: Catalog of Security Design Patterns (NFR/Level Order)
Pattern Name NFR Category Design Level Page
Secure Logger [10] Accountability Implementation 51
Full View with Errors [22] Availability Design 37
Limited View [22] Availability Design 40
Resource Acquisition is Initialization (RAII) [10] Availability Implementation 44
Defer to Kernel [10] Confidentiality Architectural 35
Multilevel Security [16] Confidentiality Architectural 40
Role-Based Access Control [16] Confidentiality Architectural 41
Role Rights Definition [16] Confidentiality Architectural 45
Authenticator [16] Confidentiality Design 30
Authorization [16] Confidentiality Design 31
Check Point [22] Confidentiality Design 32
Roles [22] Confidentiality Design 45
Secure State Machine [10] Confidentiality Design 52
Single Access Point [22] Confidentiality Design 57
Clear Sensitive Information [10] Confidentiality Implementation 33
Information Obscurity [16] Confidentiality Implementation 38
Secure Channels Confidentiality Implementation 60
Distrustful Decomposition [10] Integrity Architectural 36
Privilege Separation [10] Integrity Architectural 43
Secure Access layer [22] Integrity Architectural 59
Controlled Object Factory [16] Integrity Design 34
Secure Builder Factory [10] Integrity Design 46
Secure Chain of Responsibility [10] Integrity Design 48
Secure Factory [10] Integrity Design 49
Secure Session [22] Integrity Design 59
Secure Strategy Factory [10] Integrity Design 53
Secure Visitor [10] Integrity Design 55
Input Validation Integrity Implementation 39
Pathname Canonicalization [10] Integrity Implementation 42
Secure Directory [10] Integrity Implementation 57
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Authenticator
The Authenticator pattern verifies that a subject is who that subject claims to be. This
pattern supports the use of different authentication algorithms to accommodate different
users. This pattern keeps authentication information separated to increase security but at
the cost of complexity. [16]
Authenticator can handle many types of users that require different authentication al-
gorithms while storing sensitive information in a secure area. Algorithm complexity can be
varied to accommodate the use of protocols based on combinations of what a user knows;
what a user has; what a user is (i.e., biometrics), or where a user is. As a rule, adding
authentication protocols will increase execution time and complexity.
Figure 6: Authenticator Pattern
Figure 6 illustrates the Authenticator pattern with four participants: the Subject, Proof
of Identity, Authenticator, and Authentication Information. The Subject is the entity that
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needs to be authenticated before given access to the requested resources. Proof of Identity
is the object or token given to the Subject once it has been authenticated. The Authenti-
cator is the object encapsulating the algorithm that uses the Authentication Information to
authenticate the subject and the creator of the Proof of Identity. [16]
Authorization
The Authorization pattern identifies the subjects that may access a given resource, along
with a subject’s access privileges for that resource. [16] This pattern separates permissions
from the subject and resources. It is flexible enough to handle a variety of subjects, re-
sources, and privileges. Security policies should define privilege sets for subjects that will
be encapsulated in authorization rules. These authorization rules will be associated with a
subject and resource.
Figure 7: Authorization Pattern
Figure 7 illustrates the Authorization pattern with three participants: the Subject, Per-
mission, and Resource. The Subject is the entity that needs to access the resource. Each
Permission represents one way in which the Subject can access the Resource and provides
mechanisms to check access. [16]
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Check Point
The Check Point pattern prevents users from getting access to confidential information
and protects against malicious acts against a system’s data. [22] Check points are entities
that encapsulate an enterprise’s security policy. The Check Point pattern can be imple-
mented using the strategy pattern described in Gamma et al. [11] This use of the strategy
pattern allows different check points to be applied at different points of a system’s operation,
allowing security measures to vary by client. This is especially useful for developers who can
stub algorithms for security policies before they are known. An example of a specific check
point is a user logging into a system. During development, this check point can be stubbed
to aid programmers in testing. [22]
The Check Point pattern can be varied based on how a user logs into a system, how many
failed login attempts occurred, or what time of the day it is. This pattern separates complex
security checks into a single class to make it easier to modify and allows different strategies
to be used based on the application state. It can be used to authenticate or authorize a user.
Check points can be used to set up global information such as the current user’s id. [22]
Figure 8: Check Point Pattern
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Figure 8 illustrates the Check Point pattern where the primary participant is the Check
Point. Check Point encapsulates an enterprise’s security policy for use at any time during
a program’s run-time. This pattern separates security logic from regular application logic,
allowing security checks to be interchangeable and reusable. [22]
Clear Sensitive Information
The Clear Sensitive Information pattern prevents access to sensitive information through
a reusable resource that should have been cleared. [10] This pattern should be used if a
system’s processes have access to sensitive data through resources like memory, caches, and
disks. When a resource is released, it may still have information that can be accessed by
unauthorized users.
Figure 9: Clear Sensitive Information Pattern
Figure 9 illustrates the Clear Sensitive Information pattern with four participants: Re-
source, Application, Resource Pool, and Scrub Data. The Resource represents the reusable
resource that the Application uses. The Application passes sensitive information to the Re-
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source. The Scrub Data clears the sensitive information from the Resource before returning
it to the Resource Pool. [10]
Controlled Object Factory
The Controlled Object Factory assists in managing process permissions for objects by
determining and setting permissions at the time of object creation. [16] Object creation is
facilitated using the Factory or Factory Method pattern described in [11]. If permissions
are invariant for each object, the least privilege principle cannot be enforced. The lack of
dynamic permissions can leave objects vulnerable to misuse. This pattern defines a list of
subjects and privileges when objects are created.
This pattern should be used when security policies describe who can access objects.
One method for implementing this pattern includes the association of access control lists
(ACL) with objects. In order for systems to be flexible, they must allow dynamic changes
to an object’s permissions. When using this pattern, all objects must have permissions
defined since there will be no default permissions. Objects retrieved from resource pools
have permissions set dynamically. Issues with this pattern include creation overhead and
unclear initial permissions.
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Figure 10: Controlled Object Factory Pattern
Figure 10 illustrates the Controlled Object Factory with six participants: the Process,
Factory, CreationRequest, Object, Subject, and Access Right. The Process requests that
the Object be created. The Factory creates the Object using the Creation Request. The
Creation Request is sent by the Process and contains the Access Right between the Object
and Subject. The Subject represents other objects that may want to use the Object. The
Controlled Object Factory ensures that objects have the appropriate privileges set for all
subjects that will be using it. [16]
Defer to Kernel
The Defer to Kernel pattern separates functionality that requires elevated privileges from
unprivileged functionality. A kernel is a major component of an operating system that man-
ages the system’s key resources in ways that protect those resources from inappropriate pat-
terns of use. Defer to Kernel uses kernel-level security mechanisms in lieu of user-developed
functionality, thereby reducing time for application development and testing. [10]
This pattern can be used when a system can run an application using a user’s privileges:
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e.g., on UNIX-like systems, which assign each running application a user identifier (UID).
This pattern should not be used if the system lacks this ability or if the application does not
require elevated privilege. [10]
Figure 11: Defer to Kernel Pattern
The Defer to Kernel pattern, illustrated in figure 11, can be implemented using a basic
client-server architecture where the server runs at elevated privileges. The pattern’s partici-
pants include Client, Server, and Kernel. The Client, which runs at the user’s privilege level,
sends jobs that require elevated privileges to the Server. The Server handles requests from
the Client while using the Kernel to determine if the user has the appropriate permissions.
The Kernel provides verification for the user and provides communication mechanisms for
the client and server. [10]
Distrustful Decomposition
The Distrustful Decomposition pattern separates functionality into mutually untrusting
parts to reduce the attack surface of an individual part and to reduce data exposed if the
part is compromised. This pattern should be used to defend against attacks on vulnerable
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applications that run with elevated permissions. Examples include attacks against instances
of Internet Explorer that run with administrator privileges and buffer overflow attacks that
attack telnet daemons that run as root to execute unsafe code. This pattern is useful if a
system performs several high-level functions that require varying privilege levels. [10]
Figure 12: Distrustful Decomposition Pattern
The Distrustful Decomposition pattern, illustrated in figure 12, breaks an application into
independent programs that run as separate processes. Each process manages a subset of the
original application’s functionality. [10] The division proper typically minimizes the amount
of code that needs to run at elevated levels of privilege while restricting the privileges that
any one process gets on a ”need to have” basis. These processes communicate using some
inter-process communication (IPC) protocol. The pattern’s participants include Processes ,
a Client, and some IPC. Processes represent the partitioned program . The Client will send
requests to the appropriate Process. The IPC is used as a communication mechanism for
the processes. [10]
Full View with Errors
The Full View with Errors pattern allows developers to ignore permissions when devel-
oping a user interface. [22] This pattern allows every user to see each of a program’s options,
including options that that user is not allowed to invoke. Once a user selects the desired op-
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tion, the system determines if the user may use that operation and respond accordingly. This
architectural pattern prevents users from performing illegal operations and is very useful for
users with almost all privileges.
This pattern should be built with an error handling framework that can respond to
errors that also has a logging module. The use of this pattern allows training materials to
be consistent for all types of users. This pattern is easy to implement since one view can
be presented to all users. It may, however, confuse users by bombarding them with error
messages. Other patterns that work well with this pattern include Checks for performing
security checks on the operations and Roles for determining if a user has permission to
perform the desired operation. [22]
Information Obscurity
The Information Obscurity pattern encrypts sensitive data in insecure environments with
the goal of protecting the data from theft. [16] This pattern should be used when data
is frequently passed between internal and/or external systems. Security policies should
define the level of sensitivity of data in order to determine what data to encrypt and how
aggressively to encrypt that data. Since encryption and decryption can be time-consuming,
it is best to limit their use where possible. This pattern addresses that issue by using the
level of sensitivity to determine what needs to be obscured through encryption.
This pattern requires key storage mechanisms, encryption mechanisms, and a secure
location to store encryption keys and algorithms. [16] When using this pattern, data should
be categorized to determine its sensitivity. This categorization should be used to determine
what content needs to encrypted. Benefits for using the pattern include improved security




The Input Validation pattern ensures that data input by the subject is valid and free
from malicious text. [10] This pattern should be used when a subject’s input cannot be
trusted. Failure to validate user input could expose systems to attacks like SQL injection
and overflow attacks. To implement Input Validation, developers must identify what input
is untrusted and validate this input before using it. While input should be validated at a
trusted server, it can be also done client-side to decrease communication. [10]
Figure 13: Input Validation Process
The process, illustrated in figure 13, to implement Input Validation has five stages. First,
identify all input sources, including resources from which the system will get data. [10]
Second, identify all locations within the code from which the input sources are read. Third,
define validation rules for each location from the previous step. Fourth, specify how invalid
data is handled. Fifth, add the validation code and invalid data handling code to each
location identified in step two. Gervasio [12] gives a realization using the Strategy pattern
by Gamma et al. [10]
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Limited View
The Limited View pattern enables only functions that the current user is privileged
to access. [22] This pattern should be used when most users have permissions to a limited
number of operations. When using this pattern, security checks are performed before building
the view. Limited View uses the current session’s user’s permissions and builds a user
interface tailored to the current user. Limited View can be implemented using composites
or builders to generate the user interface or by using a state machine to represent different
views.[22]
Using Limited View results in a cleaner design with fewer security checks and a less
cluttered user interface. [22] While minimizing error messages for invalid operations, users
may be confused by the presence of unexpected options. This pattern also requires that
training material be customized for each type of user. Other patterns that may be used by
Limited View include Session to track the current user’s permissions and Roles for configuring
views. The builder and strategy can be used to manage different views. [22]
Multilevel Security
The Multilevel Security pattern determines access permissions for data objects by par-
titioning users and data into categories, based on patterns of acceptable use. [16] It uses
trusted processes to change these classifications at need. Classifications for users are called
clearances, while classifications for data are called sensitivity levels.
The use of classifications for users and data protects the system’s confidentiality and
integrity. This pattern’s use should be limited to organizations where permissions are based
on rank or position within an organization: e.g., in the United States military. [16]
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Figure 14: Multilevel Security Pattern
Figure 14 illustrates the Multilevel Security pattern with seven participants: Subject,
Data, TrustedProcess, Category, Clearance, Category, and Classification. The Subject con-
tains the Category for the organizational unit to which it belongs and the Clearance. Clear-
ance represents the Subject’s clearance level; it is used to determine access permissions. The
Data also contains the Category for the organizational unit to which it belongs and the
Classification. Classification represents the Data’s sensitivity level; it is used to determine
the access permissions. The TrustedProcess is the entity that can change the Clearance level
for the Subject and Classification level for the Data. [16]
Role-Based Access Control
The Role-Based Access Control pattern associates permissions with users based on their
system-assigned roles. [16] Associating user with roles and roles with permissions eliminates
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the work of associating individual users with individual sets of permissions. This pattern is
appropriate when a large number of users or a large number of resources share related access
privileges.
Figure 15: Role-Based Access Control Pattern
Figure 15 illustrates the Role-Based Access Control pattern with four participants: User,
Role, PermissionsTo, and DataObject. User is the class that represents the system’s current
user. [16] Role represents the current role the user has assumed. DataObject represents the
data the user wishes to access. An association class, PermissionsTo, determines the role’s
permissions for the DataObject. Note that the User has a many-to-many relationship to the
Role, and Role has a many-to-many relationship with DataObject. [16]
This pattern reduces the workload for managing users and simpler security, since there
are many more users than roles. This pattern also allows users to switch between roles,
making the application easier to use. [16]
Pathname Canonicalization
The Pathname Canonicalization pattern ensures that the path to given files and direc-
tories is valid and free of links to other locations.[10] This pattern should be used when
an application accepts pathnames from its users. This pattern protects against directory
traversal vulnerabilities. To implement this pattern, the application must use the OS spe-
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cific pathname canonicalization function to retrieve the canonicalized pathname from a given
path. This canonicalized pathname is then used to access file system resources. This ensures
that the resource is not a link. [10]
This pattern has two participants: Application and File System. The Application pro-
cesses a request from the user to open a file system resource. The Application uses the File
System to determine if the given file path is secure. This pattern prevents the user from
accessing file system resources outside of the appropriate environment. [10]
Privilege Separation
The Privilege Separation pattern limits the amount of code that runs at an elevated
privilege without affecting program functionality. [10] This pattern is a specialization of the
Distrustful Decomposition pattern. This pattern should be used when there is a small subset
of functionality that requires elevated privileges. This pattern is useful if the application has
a large attack surface and system functionality requires user to authentication.
Figure 16: Privilege Separation Pattern Example
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The example given in figure 16 has four participants: Privileged Process, Unprivileged
Process, Client, and User Privileged Process. [10] The Privileged Process handles initial
requests from the Client. A client can be a user or another process. Once a request is
received, an Unprivileged Process is created to handle authentication with the client. After
authentication is completed, the Privileged Process creates a User Privileged Process. This
User Privileged Process handles all further requests from the client. If an attacker gains
control of the User Privileged Process, it will be confined within the limitations of the process.
This protects the system’s Privileged Process from attackers. By separating responsibility
into different processes, code is easier to review and test. [10]
To generalize the implementation of Privilege Separation, create a server with elevated
privileges to handle initial user requests. Once a request has been received, spawn an unpriv-
ileged process to handle authentication. Finally, once authentication has completed, spawn
another process with limited privileges based on the client’s credentials to handle the clients
requests. [10]
Resource Acquisition Is Initialization
The Resource Acquisition Is Initialization (RAII) pattern ensures that an object’s re-
sources are properly allocated and deallocated by using the object’s constructor and de-
structor instead of relying on the client. [10] This pattern should be used when resource
usage could be intensive enough to trigger memory reallocation. This can expose data that
should have been cleared before reuse.
Implementing RAII ensures that the resources needed by an object are allocated in
the constructor and deallocated in the object’s destructor, instead of relying on the client
to manage them. Alternatives to this approach include the use of garbage collection or
dependency injection paradigm. [10]
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Role Rights Definition
The Role Rights Definition pattern upholds the principle of “least privilege” by basing
the assignment of permissions on use cases. [16] This pattern should be used when roles
correspond to functional tasks, permissions needs to be assigned using the “least privilege”
principle, roles change often, and/or permissions should be independent of implementation.
Sequence diagrams are used to determine what operations a role can perform in a system.
These operations are then used to determine that role’s permissions. This is performed for
all actors of a use case diagram. [16]
Role Rights Definition is typically used with other role based permission patterns such
as Role Based Access Control (RBAC). This pattern requires the development of use cases
and the analysis of sequence diagrams to determine minimal permissions for roles relative to
their responsibilities. [16]
Roles
The Roles pattern consolidates security policies that apply to multiple users into a single
entity. [22] Associating privileges with roles instead of individual users makes it easier to
manage groups of users with common privileges. A strategy for implementing Roles is to
allow a user to have multiple roles and a role to have multiple privileges. This implementation
allows each role to represent a stakeholder and to capture the stakeholder’s appropriate
privileges. Role-based inheritance relationships can also be used to form a hierarchy of roles.
One consequence of the Roles pattern is that administrators manage user-role and role-
privilege relationships instead of user-privilege relationships. Associating multiple users to
a role is simpler than associating users with individualized sets of privileges. Other con-
sequences include the system having a good way to group privileges and it being more
convenient to administer. These benefits come at the cost of adding an extra layer of com-
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plexity to the system. One well known application of Roles is UNIX’s owner-group-other
role system. Roles are also known as Actors, Groups and Profiles. [22]
Figure 17: Roles Pattern
Figure 17 illustrates the Roles pattern with three participants: User, Role, and Privilege.
A User is associated with a Role. Once the user is associated with a Role, that user gains
Privileges associated with the Role. [22]
Secure Builder Factory
The Secure Builder Factory pattern separates security logic from the creation of complex
objects: objects that are constructed from several other objects. [10] This pattern can be
used when security credentials dictate a complex object’s composition. This pattern applies
if the system uses the Builder pattern given by [11] and the Builder is dependent on the user
security privileges.
The Secure Builder Factory pattern provides an easy way to select a strategy object
based on the security credentials. This pattern is extended from Secure Factory Pattern and
uses the strategy pattern given in [11]. This pattern should be used when behavior needs
to vary based on the user logged into the system and can only be determined by the user’s
credentials.
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Figure 18: Secure Builder Factory Pattern
Figure 18 illustrates the Secure Builder Factory pattern with seven participants: Abstract
Secure Builder Factory, Concrete Secure Builder Factory, Abstract Builder, Security Level
Builder, Director, Security Credentials and Client. [22] Abstract Secure Builder Factory is
the primary participant: it provides an instance of the builder factory, provides a function
to change the builder factory instance at run-time, and defines the interface for retrieving an
object to be implemented in the concrete secure builder factory. Concrete Builder Factory
represents the concrete implementations of the abstract factory: it implements the getBuilder
method. Abstract Builder defines the required methods for all Security Level Builder classes.
Security Level Builder implements the required algorithms for the user with the appropriate
security level. [22] The Director is used by the Client to build and return complex objects
using the Security Level Builder. Directors are better described in [11]. The Client tracks
a user’s security credentials: it uses the getInstance method to retrieve a concrete instance
of the builder and then gets a builder for the given security credentials using the concrete
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factory’s getBuilder method. Security Credentials represents the current’s user credentials.
The Secure Builder Factory pattern separates and hides security logic from the Client
resulting in more concise code that is easier to test. The Secure Builder Factory acts as a
black box that allows security logic to change independently of the Client’s behavior. [10]
Secure Chain of Responsibility
The Secure Chain of Responsibility pattern separates security checks from their associated
actions. [10] This pattern can be used when a handler in a chain of responsibility uses
security credentials to determine if that handler should run. An example given by [10] is the
implementation of a role-based access system where each role is represented as a handler in
the chain. When a request is passed down the chain, the user’s credentials are passed down
with it.
Secure Chain of Responsibility is almost identical to the Chain of Responsibility given
by [11], except that a method to check credentials is implemented by each handler. This
method is used in the handleRequest method before handling the request or passing the
request to the next handler.
Figure 19: Secure Chain of Responsibility Pattern
Figure 19 illustrates the Secure Chain of Responsibility pattern with four participants:
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Abstract Handler, Concrete Handler, Security Credentials, and Client. Abstract Handler
defines the interface that the Concrete Handlers must implement. Concrete Handlers invoke
requests that they are designed to manage, conditional upon a request’s passing the security
check. This check differentiates this pattern different than the one given by [11]. The Client
tracks a user’s security credentials and gives the request to the chain’s first handler. Security
Credentials represents the current’s user credentials. [10]
The Secure Chain of Responsibility pattern separates the security logic into a method
within the handler making it easier to modify and test. The chain acts as a black box that
allows the system to change how it responds to requests independently of the code that
makes the request. [10]
Secure Factory
The Secure Factory pattern separates the security logic for selecting an object from the
creation of that object. [10] The pattern is an extension of the Abstract Factory pattern
given by [11]. Abstract Factory is used for its ability to transparently change the Concrete
Factory during run-time. The primary motivation for using this pattern is to make it easier
to test and verify the logic used to select or create the object. This also makes it easier to
modify the logic for selecting an object based on security requirements.
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Figure 20: Secure Factory Pattern
Figure 20 illustrates the Security Factory pattern with four participants: Abstract Secure
Factory, Concrete Secure Factory, Security Credentials, and Client. Abstract Secure Factory
is the primary participant: it provides an instance of the Secure Factory, provides a function
to change the Secure Factory instance at run-time, and defines the interface for retrieving an
object to be implemented in the Concrete Secure Factory classes. Concrete Secure Factory
represents the concrete implementations of the abstract factory that implements the getO-
bject method. The Client class tracks a user’s security credentials: it uses the getInstance
method to retrieve a concrete instance of the factory and then gets an object for the given
security credentials using the concrete factory’s getObject. Security Credentials represents
the current’s user credentials. [10]
The Secure Factory pattern separates and hides security logic from the Client resulting
in more concise code that is easier to test. The Secure Factory acts as a black box that
allows security logic to change without having to change the behavior of the Client. [10]
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Secure Logger
The Secure Logger pattern protects a system’s logs from access by potential attackers
and prevents attackers from altering logs to hide their activity. [10] This pattern should
be used when the system stores logging information externally and when these logs contain
sensitive information.
Figure 21: Secure Logger Process
Figure 21 illustrates the Secure Logger pattern with four participants: Application, Se-
cure Logger, Log Reader, and Log Viewer. The Application creates the logs that will be
handled by the Secure Logger. Secure Logger encrypts the logs to make it difficult for at-
tackers to access the logs. Log Reader decrypts the logs for the Log Viewer, which limits
log access to authorized users. Log Reader can be a part of the Secure Logger system.
The Secure Logger pattern ensures that logs acquired by attackers are nearly impossible to
decipher and that modification to the logs are detectable. [10]
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Secure State Machine
The Secure State Machine pattern provides a “clear separation between security mecha-
nisms and user-level functionality by implementing the security and user-level functionality
in two different state machines”. [10] By separating security and user-level functionality,
designers increase the design’s cohesion, making it easy to test, review, and verify security
properties. This decreases the likelihood of introducing vulnerabilities into the system. The
pattern also decreases coupling between the security and user-level functionality, making
future modifications to the system easier.
Figure 22: Secure State Machine Pattern
Figure 22 illustrates the Secure State Machine pattern with four participants: Secure
Context, Secure State, User Function Context, and User Function State. [10] Secure Context,
the primary participant, provides all operations to the client and acts as a proxy to the User
Function Context. Secure State is an abstract class that must define all functionality handled
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by the secure state machine. Secure State will be subclassed by several concrete classes that
represent how the security state changes based on the system’s current user. User Function
Context is a class whose functionality must match the Secure State class so that requests can
be forwarded to the User Function State when security requirements are met. User Function
Context can only be created by Security Context. User Function State is an abstract class
that must have the same interface as the Secure State. The Secure State Machine pattern
“separate[s] security mechanics from user-level functionality” and “prevents programmatic
access to the user-level functionality that avoids security” checks. [10]
Secure Strategy Factory
The Secure Strategy Factory pattern provides an easy way to select a strategy object
based on the user’s security credentials. [10] This pattern combines Secure Factory with
the Strategy pattern as given in [11]. This pattern should be used when behavior needs to
vary based on the user logged into the system and can only be determined by the user’s
credentials.
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Figure 23: Secure Strategy Factory Pattern
Figure 23 illustrates the Secure Strategy Factory pattern with six participants: Abstract
Secure Strategy Factory, Concrete Secure Strategy Factory, Abstract Strategy, Security Level
Strategy, Security Credentials and Client. [10] Abstract Secure Strategy Factory is the pri-
mary participant: it provides an instance of the strategy factory, provides a function to
change the security factory instance at run-time, and defines the interface for retrieving an
object to be implemented in the concrete secure strategy factory. Concrete Secure Fac-
tory represents the concrete implementations of the Abstract Factory that implement the
getStrategy method. Abstract Strategy defines the required methods for all Security Level
Strategy classes. Security Level Strategy implements the required algorithms for the user
with the appropriate security level. The Client tracks the user’s security credentials. The
Client uses the getInstance method to retrieve a concrete instance of the factory and then
gets a strategy for the given security credentials using the concrete factory’s getStrategy
method. Security Credentials represents the current’s user credentials. [10]
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The Secure Strategy Factory pattern separates and hides security logic from the Client,
resulting in more concise code that is easier to test. The Secure Strategy Factory acts as a
black box that allows security logic to change independently of the Client’s behavior. [10]
Secure Visitor
The Secure Visitor pattern gives designers the tools to deny access to a node if a user lacks
the appropriate privileges. [10] When using the Visitor pattern given by [11], a hierarchy
is used to structure data into different nodes. This means the node is locked to all visitors
except those who have the proper security credentials. This results in a clear separation of
security logic from user functionality.
As with the Visitor pattern given by [11], Secure Visitor should be used with a system that
has its data organized hierarchically. This pattern also places different access restrictions on
each node.
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Figure 24: Secure Visitor Pattern
Figure 24 illustrates the Secure Visitor pattern with nine participants: Abstract Visitor,
Concrete Visitor, Base Locked Node, Locked Node, Abstract Unlocked Node, Unlocked
Node, Node Structure, Security Credentials, and Client. [10] The Abstract Visitor is exactly
the same as [11]’s Visitor pattern except that its visit method takes an Unlocked Node.
Concrete Visitor implements the methods defined in Abstract Visitor. Base Locked Node
defines an accept method that takes a Visitor and Security Credentials. This participant
also provides a method to check the user’s credentials and defines an abstract method for
unlocking the node. The Locked Node implements the accept and unlock methods, which
test the user’s credentials: if the credentials are correct the Locked Node will provide the
appropriate Unlocked Node to the Visitor’s visitNode method. The Abstract Unlocked Node
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represents the functionality for the Locked Node. The Unlocked Node is the implementation
of the Abstract Unlocked Node and contains the functionality needed by the associated
Locked Node that will be unlocked once security check is passed. The Client maintains
the user Security Credentials, the instantiated Visitor, and the Node Structure containing
a hierarchy of Locked Nodes. The Locked Node acts as a security checkpoint to the actual
node functionality that is contained in the Unlocked Node. This pattern clearly separates
security logic from the user functionality and prevents access to this functionality without
proper security checks. [10]
Secure Directory
The Secure Directory pattern protects files from being manipulated by an attacker. [10]
This pattern should be used when an application uses files for an extended time of period.
It protects against malicious file modification, including the use of race conditions to obtain
unauthorized access to files. Secure Directory limits a program’s access to those resources
that that program’s user may access. This is useful for applications that need to read and/or
write to files in an insecure environment.
Secure Directory forces a program to find the canonical pathname for a file’s directory
and check if the directory is secure. This pattern has two participants: Program and File
System. The Program is ensures the directory on the File System can only be written to by
the user of the program. [10]
Single Access Point
The Single Access Point pattern restricts access into an application to one entry point.
[22] Security requirements are complicated by the need to support multiple external inter-
faces. This pattern removes the need to validate users at multiple entry points and duplicate
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security-related code throughout an application. The pattern’s lone entry point must col-
lect all information about a user needed throughout the system. The entry point must also
launch all sub-applications and may force the user to enter information that is unnecessary
for the user’s current session. [22]
This pattern may be used when a system is a composition of other applications that could
result in duplicated code for logging in a user. Multiple entry points could need different
data requiring the user to provide unnecessary information when gaining access to different
parts of the system. This results in a larger attack surface, making the system less secure
and a simpler control flow, making the system easier to test. [22]
Figure 25: Single Access Point Pattern
Figure 25 illustrates the Single Access Point pattern with four participants: Client, Single
Access Point, System, and Application. The Client is the user or process that wants to gain
access to the System. This is done by going through the Single Access Point. The System
can be comprised of the Application the Client wishes to gain access to. [22]
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Secure Session
The Secure Session pattern can be used to store globally relevant information, such as a
user’s username and roles, for use throughout an application. Session can be implemented as
a Singleton pattern [11]. Session is often used in web applications to store a user’s information
between requests. Since HTTP is stateless, using Session allows a user to interact with an
application without having to reenter access credentials.
The Secure Session provides a location to store common data that is made available to
all components. It may, unfortunately, become complex if it must store a large amount of
information. [22]
Secure Access Layer
The Secure Access Layer pattern provides a secure method for communicating with ex-
ternal systems. [10] System integration often leaves weaknesses at the boundaries between
the initial systems’ APIs. Implementing security checks on both sides of these boundary
points may yield duplicate code, making the integrated system more difficult to maintain
and test. This pattern should be used when interfacing with external systems that may not
be secure. [10]
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Figure 26: Secure Access Layer Pattern
The Secure Access Layer pattern, illustrated in figure 26 can isolate communications
between different applications, making the system easier to maintain and test. By using
Secure Access Layer, a system can be ported to a different platform more easily. [10]
Secure Channels
The Secure Channel pattern ensures that connections between clients and servers are
secure, especially when communicating over public networks. [16] The Secure Channels
pattern encrypts sensitive data while transmitting other data in the clear in order to re-
duce encryption overhead. This pattern requires the client and server to establish secure
connections.
Benefits for using this pattern include improved security and minimal development time,
due to the use of existing technology to implement secure communications without impacting
the exchange of non-sensitive data. Issues with this pattern include decreased performance




Three case studies were undertaken to evaluate the effectiveness of the mapping from
security NFRs to security patterns developed in Chapters 2 and 3. The basis for these case
studies, the Online Tenure and Promotion System (OLTP), is a system that was developed
for managing documents and other artifacts related to tenure and promotion. This system,
as described below, has nontrivial requirements that determine when these documents can
be uploaded to the system and who is authorized to upload and view them.
Each of these three studies was conducted using the following five-step methodology.
First, four security non-functional requirements (NFRs) were selected based on their impor-
tance to the OLTP. Second, these NFRs were mapped to security issues in the hierarchy
created in Chapter 2. Third, three patterns were selected, based on the related security
issues, from the catalogue in Chapter 3. Fourth, a security mechanism implemented in the
original system was replaced with a security pattern selected from the catalogue. Finally,
the original and new design were compared to determine how well they satisfied the selected
security NFRs.
Online Tenure and Promotion System
The Online Tenure and Promotion System (OLTP) is an electronic program that replaces
a paper process for application for tenure and promotion. This system was originally de-
veloped for East Tennessee State University (ETSU). It provides a platform to manage and
document tenure and/or promotion for faculty members who meet the appropriate require-
ments. Tenure is a status given to faculty that protects them from being terminated without
just cause. A faculty member can be promoted through four different levels, starting at the
instructor or assistant professor level and progressing through associate professor and full
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professor.
The tenure and promotion process takes a full calendar year and has many stages and
types of users. The stages follow a timeline that associates different users with different
permissions at different stages of the process. The tenure and promotion process involves
the management of several types of electronic artifacts: documents uploaded as PDF files,
recommendations entered as a yes or no, committee votes, and electronic report signatures
for each candidate. High level requirements for the OLTP system state that users should be
able to perform tasks required to create the artifacts for their given role(s).
The OLTP’s requirements for user-dependent, stage-based functionality created three
broad classes of security-related challenges for the system designers. The first involved
tracking the various stages of the tenure and promotion process. For this, the idea of a
timeline was developed that was used to check the current date against the Tenure and
Promotion deadlines. The second involved determining a user’s permissions: a concern that
was met by associating each user with a role. The third involved tracking the completeness
of the artifacts related to individual cases of tenure and promotion.
A timeline consisting of nine stages, detailed in Table 3, was developed for the OLTP.
Each stage was associated with role information and that stage’s required actions.
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Table 3: Online Tenure and Promotion Timeline
Stage Date Range User Type (Role) Actions
System
Setup
Aug 1 - Aug 15 Administrator
Add candidates to system
Set up department and college committees
Candidate Aug 16 - Sep 15























Oct 08 - Oct 15
Department
Chair





















Dec 16 - Feb 01 College Dean






Feb 02 - Mar 01 Vice President
Upload Vice President Report
Enter Recommendation
Sign VP Report




At each stage, the system’s users can invoke actions that are specific to that stage and
their role. Other actions that can be performed by all roles at their given stage include
viewing documents, recommendations, votes, and signatures from the previous stage. In
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order to view the artifacts from a previous stage, all actions that are required for that stage
must have been completed. This includes the uploading of required reports, the recording of
required recommendations and votes, and the signing of all required reports by all associated
users.
Users of the system should only see candidates that they have permission to view. These
permissions are determined by a user’s membership in colleges, departments, department
committees, and college committees. This includes two administrative roles that monitor
the system. The college administrator and university administrator can view candidates in
their college and the university respectively.
Initial OLTP Design
The designers considered several security NFRs requiring certain elements to be well
defined. A role represents a certain type of system user. For example, the candidate role
is associated with individuals who are applying for tenure and/or promotion. Chairs and
members who are on a committee will get the appropriate committee chair and committee
member role. A file type represents a type of file. Specific types of files include candidate files,
committee reports, and administrative reports. Upload privileges for file types are specific to
roles. For example, the candidate role uploads candidate files such as supporting documents,
department chairs upload peer reviews and the department chair report (administrative), and
committee chairs upload committee reports.
The system uses four types of artifacts: files that represent committee reports and ad-
ministrative reports, votes that are associated with committee reports, recommendations
that are associated with a chair or dean administrative reports, and signatures that are
associated with all reports uploaded. Timeline elements determine when a role can upload
and view files, enter and view committee votes and recommendations, sign reports, and view
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signatures.
The system designers considered four main security related non-functional requirements.
First, system designers must provide a mechanism for authenticating users using the univer-
sity’s authentication services and saving user information for later use (persistence). Second,
users must be associated with one to many roles. It is possible for a committee member also
be a candidate; this has to be considered when setting up committees and user permissions.
Third, user functionality must be available during the appropriate stage, such as file upload,
votes/recommendation entry forms, and report signing. Fourth, completed artifacts should
only be viewable after the associated stage has been completed, a requirement that involves
file and artifact statuses as well as timelines. Figure 27 is a partial class diagram showing
the original OLTP design with only four roles represented.
Figure 27: Original OLTP Class Design Simplified
The first NFR is met by authenticating users with LDAP efficiently but fails in how user
information is made persistent once logged in. Currently, user information is stored in a
global space and is not limited to the current user’s instantiation of the system.
The second security concern is handled in a way that clutters the user interface and makes
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debugging difficult. When a user is logged into the system, that user sees all functionality
that is available to all of that user’s roles. This makes the user interface confusing and
debugging difficult, because there is no way to distinguish what functionality is associated
with what role.
The third and fourth concerns are managed using a single class, the timeline class. This
class has a high complexity and much repeated code. This makes it difficult to debug and
modify as new roles and file types are added to the system. Using one complex class to handle
all timeline security concerns increased the probability of inducing errors when modifying
the system and made it difficult to verify that a security requirement has been met. This
occurred several times when altering the system to fit the clients’ changing needs. Table 4
lists the selected security NFRs along with the current implementation’s deficiency.
Table 4: Online Tenure and Promotion Selected NFRs
OLTP Security NFR Current Implementation Deficiency
OLTP-NFR-1 authenticate users with uni-
versity’s authentication ser-
vices
once logged in, user information is stored in a
global space
OLTP-NFR-2 user can fulfill one to many
roles
user is presented with all functionality associ-
ated with all roles he/she has. This clutters the
interface and increases debugging ability
OLTP-NFR-3 user functionality is depen-
dent on current stage of time-
line
all decisions based on timeline and artifact
state is made in one class, the timeline class,
that results in high complexity and repeated
code. This makes debugging and modifying
roles difficult
OLTP-NFR-4 artifacts are only viewable
during appropriate stages if
artifact is complete and user
has permission
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Case Study - Limited View
To assess the effectiveness of the Limited View design pattern for satisfying non-functional
requirements (NFR), its use was considered in the context of the OLTP’s design. This pattern
is ideal for the OLTP due to the number of different operations it supports. Limited View
presents users with only those operations that they may access, dynamically building the
GUI at run time. This pattern is the alternative to the Full View with Errors pattern. To
compare the effectiveness of the Limited View and Full View patterns relative to the OLTP,
a mockup of a Limited View implementation was constructed, as follows:
• Each user type, represented by role, was limited to the functionality available to that
role.
• User functionality was limited to a subset provided by the real system includes canU-
ploadFile, uploadFile, and canViewFile.
• Security considerations were analyzed and are described in section 4.
Five Roles were considered for this exercise: Candidate, Department Chair, Department
Committee Chair, College Dean, and Administrator. Mockups were created as if the user
were logged into the system as a department chair and the process had entered the “de-
partment chair review” stage. The department chair can perform the following functions:
Upload Department Chair Report, Enter Department Chair Recommendation, and Sign De-
partment Chair Report. Chairs may also delete the file that he/she uploaded by selecting
the red delete icon next to the file.
The first of the three images presented below uses the Full View with Errors showing
all options available for the given screen to all users. The second image highlights the
functionality only available to the current user. All other options trigger an access denied
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error. The third image shows the same interface using the Limited View pattern. The
user’s functionality is available to the user by the use of buttons that is grouped with other
functionality illustrated in figure 28. Figure 29 shows the functionality highlighted while
figure 30 shows how the GUI looks with Limited View.
Figure 28: GUI using Full View with Errors Pattern
Figure 29: GUI with Relevant Functionality Highlighted
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Figure 30: GUI using Limited View Pattern
Result
Using the Limited View pattern unclutters the user interface, making it easier to use.
Even though it is more difficult to limit the functionality presented, the user is less confused
when using the system. Feedback shows that the application of the Limited View pattern
resolves issues that arose due to user playing multiple roles within the system detailed in the
description of OLTP-NFR-2. This pattern makes the verification of security requirements
easier.
Case Study - Role-Based Access Control
The Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) design pattern has been applied to a user case
from the OLTP system to assess its effectiveness. The use case handles the following behavior:
• Each user can be associated with one to many roles.
• Functionality within the system is determined based on the user’s current role.
• Artifacts represented in this design only include File and Votes.
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• Security considerations are described in table 4.
Five Roles were considered for this exercise: Candidate, Department Chair, Department
Committee Chair, College Dean, and Administrator. The class diagram in figure 15 shows
design patterns original elements. The class diagram in figure 31 shows the OLTP partially
redesigned using the Role-Based Access Control pattern.
Figure 31: Class diagram using the Role-Based Access Control pattern
Result
The RBAC pattern isolates security checks into a Permission class. The Permission class
represents the multiplicity of permissions associated between a Role and an Artifact. The
Permission Class uses the Timeline class to determine which access action is allowed on the
Artifact. Access types include creation of a new artifact, reading (accessing) the artifact,
and deleting the artifact. The pattern associates multiple roles with a user, allowing the
system to switch a user’s permissions by switching the active role.
By separating the permissions from the Role class within the system, developers can
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create new permissions without having to modify code within each Role class. Application
of the RBAC pattern to the OLTP resolves some deficiencies apparent in the initial system
implementation. OLTP-NFR-2 is handled by associating a user with multiple roles and
giving the user the ability to switch between roles. OLTP-NFR-3 and OLTP-NFR-4 were
handled by placing the timeline and the security concerns into different classes: Permission,
Timeline, and Artifact. Decoupling these concerns resulted in the Permission class using the
Timeline to make decisions based on what stage the process was in. This separation decreased
code duplication and simplified the security code. This pattern fits the application’s needs
because the OLTP has many users with relatively few roles. The small number of roles
makes managing permissions by role easier than managing permissions by individual users.
Case Study- Secure State Machine
The Secure State Machine pattern has been applied to Online Tenure and Promotion
System (OLTP) in a use case. The following behavior in the use case has been designed and
implemented using the Secure State Machine pattern:
• A user must log in before using the system.
• Each type of user, represented by role, is limited to the functionality available to that
role.
• User functionality was limited to a subset provided by the real system includes canU-
ploadFile, uploadFile, and canViewFile.
• Security considerations are described in table 4.
The class diagram in figure 22 shows design patterns original elements. The class diagram
in figure 22 show the OLTP partially redesigned using the Secure State Machine pattern.
Figure 32: Class diagram using the Secure State Machine pattern.
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Figure 32: Class diagram using the Secure State Machine pattern
Result
Using different concrete SecurityStates separates security concerns for different system
users into different classes. Each concrete SecurityState has a matching timeline that de-
termines what functionality is available to the specific role based on that process’s stage.
The SecurityState will encapsulate the user information once he/she is authenticated. This
separation allows for the system to easily accommodate security changes that the client may
request. To modify a given role’s security concerns, programmers can modify the relevant
SecurityState class instead of digging through a very large class that would handle all secu-
rity concerns. Adding a new role to the system is achieved by adding a new SecurityState
and Timeline. Smaller, concise concrete classes reduce errors when adding new roles to the
system.
Application of the SecureState pattern to the OLTP resolves deficiencies apparent in the
initial system implementation. OLTP-NFR-1 is resolved by storing user information in the
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concrete SecurityState class as opposed to the global space. This hides user information from
other parts of the system. OLTP-NFR-2 is handled by forcing the user to assume one role at
a time. This limits the functionality presented to the user current role instead of presenting
all functionality available to a user. In addition to having the login functionality, the system
will require the ability for users to switch between roles. This was not included in the
design to simplify diagrams. OLTP-NFR-3 and OLTP-NFR-4 were handled by splitting the
timeline and the security concerns into two classes: Timeline and SecurityState. Decoupling
these concerns resulted in the SecurityState class using the Timeline to make decisions based





Modules for teaching security in a computer science curriculum have been developed to
demonstrate techniques and security design patterns to meet the NFRs detailed in Chapter
2. These modules include a description, objective, and activities for each security module.
Modules are listed with the NFR category it covers along with security design patterns that
could be used in the module. Similiar modules have been developed in [20], [19], and [2].
The modules presented here, as a rule, give students practice in security-related concepts
by tasking them with two to three assignments. The first assignment presents students with
a discussion worksheet that explains the security issue at hand, along with questions to
answer. The second assignment presents students with an application to test and attempt
to break in a way that relates to the security issues. The third assignment presents students
with the source code for the application in previous assignment. The student is instructed
to modify the code in an attempt to address the security issue. Table 5 lists the courses
covered along with the concentrations the courses are in, the year the course is taught, and
the security module developed for it.
Table 5: Catalog of Security Design Patterns
Course Concentration Year Security Module
CS1: Introduction to Programming I CS, IT, IS Freshman Integer Overflow
CS2: Introduction to Programming II CS, IT, IS Freshman File Access
WEB1: Introduction to Web Development IT, IS Freshman HTTPS
DB: Database Fundamentals CS, IT, IS Sophomore SQL Injection
WEB2: Server-side Development IT, IS Sophomore Input Validation
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CS1: Introduction to Programming I
Introduction to Programming I is the first programming intensive course in the ETSU
Computer Science Department undergraduate curriculum. It teaches the basic programming
concepts, including data types, control flow, classes, and methods. A security assignment
for this course needed to be simple enough for beginning computer science students to un-
derstand. Instead of adding a new security module to the course and increasing the course
material, an existing topic, the integer data type, was extended to include a unit on integer
overflow. Integer overflow occurs when an arithmetic operation generates a value that is too
large to store relative to a target data type. Overflow can result in erroneous computations,
due to result truncation and/or rollover, or program failure, depending on a language’s im-
plementation. The concept of overflow also applies to other primitive types such as Java’s
short and long data types. The teaching module for integer overflow includes three activities
for students to perform.
The first, discussion assignment for the CS1 unit presents students with a short narra-
tive and questions covering integer overflow. Students are then given a Java program that
simulates a bank account. Students are asked to break the program by using values that
exceed what the data type (short) used to hold the balance can store and asked questions
about the assignment. Finally, students are given the code for the simulation from the pre-
vious assignment. They are asked to modify the program to fix the security flaw caused by
overflow. This module also includes the answer key for each assignment and source code for
use by the facilitator.
This module demonstrates an example of data integrity vulnerability. There are no
patterns given in the security design pattern catalog that could address this vulnerability.
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CS2: Introduction to Programming II
Introduction to Programming II is a continuation of CS1. It covers topics that include
advanced object oriented programming (OOP) paradigm, exception handling, graphical user
interface (GUI) development, and file processing. The security component for CS2 proposed
here extends the file processing module to show the security issues involved with using files
in a program.
Security concerns related to file access include vulnerabilities involving pathnames, per-
missions, and race conditions. Improperly managed pathnames can afford access to parts of
a file system that should be off-limits to the pathname’s user, via symbolic links or directory
walking using “..”, the path to a file system object’s parent directory. Improperly configured
file permissions may allow a user to delete files without proper authorization. Race condi-
tions can allow two or more processes to interfere with each other’s operation by updating
common files in incompatible ways.
The teaching module for file access includes three activities. The first is a discussion
assignment on pathname canonicalization, the practice of ensuring that all files are referred
to by a valid canonical path. The second gives students a Java program that simulates a bank
account. This program will use a file to store account information. Students are asked to
break the program by using filepaths that access files the program is not intended to access.
Students are asked to investigate security issues associated with pathname vulnerabilities.
The third gives students the code for this exercise. It asks them to modify the code to fix
the security flaw caused by pathname vulnerability. This module also includes the answer
key for each assignment and source code for use the facilitator
This module demonstrates examples of security vulnerabilities involving integrity or con-
fidentiality. Improper file access could allow an attacker to gain access to a resource he/she
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is not authorized to access or allow an attacker to pass parameters to an application he/she
may have modified. Pathname canonicalization is an implementation level pattern that can
help address some issues with file access.
WEB1: Introduction to Web Development
Introduction to Web Development tasks students with creating static websites using
hypertext markup language (HTML) and cascading style sheets (CSS). Students are taught
web design principles, graphics, forms, communication protocols, and so on. For this course,
a new teaching module was created to teach the differences between the standard hypertext
transfer protocol (HTTP) and the secure version of this protocol. The latter, Hypertext
Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS), extends HTTP by placing the HTTP layer on top of
the Secure Socket Layer/Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS) layer. By using HTTP on
top of SSL/TLS, web servers can use authentication to check the validity of requests, to
protect against man-in-the-middle attacks. The teaching module for HTTPS includes only
one activity: a narrative explaining HTTPS with the advantage and disadvantages of using
HTTPS. The student is given several questions to answer about this narrative, along with
some questions that will require internet research. This module also includes the answer key
for the assignment.
DB: Database Fundamentals
Database Fundamentals, an introductory course on databases, teaches students how to
create databases, connect to databases, and interact with databases using Structured Query
Language (SQL). Students also learn what a RDBMS is, what primary and foreign keys are,
how to build SQL queries, how to aggregate data, and how to debug SQL. For this course,
a new teaching module was created to teach students what SQL injection is and how to
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protect against it. SQL injection involves the use of incorrectly preprocessed input to insert
malicious code into requests made to a database. Failure to account for SQL injection can
result in unauthorized access to or the corruption or destruction of database content.
The teaching module for SQL injection includes three activities. The first is a discussion
assignment on SQL injection and the practice of sanitizing user input to protect databases
from attackers. The second gives students a Java program that simulates a bank account.
This program uses a database to store account information. The student is asked to delete
all accounts using SQL injection. The third gives students the simulation’s code. It asks
them to modify the code to fix the security flaw associated with SQL injection. This module
also includes the answer key for the assignment.
This module demonstrates a data integrity vulnerability that can be addressed using the
input validation pattern from the security design pattern catalogue.
WEB2: Server-side Development
Server-side Development, an introductory course on server application development,
teaches students how to develop and maintain web applications, object-oriented PHP, ses-
sions, database integration, and web site security. Students learn server-side scripting lan-
guages that include PHP and Coldfusion. For this course, a new teaching module was created
to teach students proper techniques for validating user input. Improper validation can lead
to attackers gaining control of the system, modifying underlying databases, and injecting
malicious code.
The teaching module for Input Validation includes two activities. The first is a discussion
assignment on Input Validation and the need to validate user provided data. The second
gives students a PHP script that simulates a sign-up form for an online account. It asks
them to test the form and add proper input validation. This module also includes the answer
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key for the assignment. This module demonstrates a data integrity vulnerability that can
be addressed using the input validation pattern from the security design pattern catalogue.
Status of Future Modules
The modules presented in this chapter cover freshman and sophomore level courses, but
include few examples of actual security design pattern use. Modules for junior and senior
level courses are under development. These modules will demonstrate more uses for patterns





Strategies for software development often slight security-related considerations during
systems development. Three possible reasons for this include the difficulty of developing
realizable security requirements, the difficulty of applying appropriate techniques, and a
lack of training in secure systems design. The research presented in this thesis proposes a
three-part strategy for addressing these concerns. Part 1 involves the use of questions for
eliciting precise, realizable requirements for system security is presented in Chapter 2. These
questions are derived from a two-level characterization of system security, based on work by
Chung et. al. [8], that defines security in terms of a 2-level hierarchy, with confidential-
ity, integrity, availability, and accountability at level 1. Part 2 involves the use of a novel
framework for relating these level-2 attributes to previously published, carefully documented
strategies, a.k.a. patterns, for secure software development presented in Chapter 3. Case
studies are included that suggest the framework’s effectiveness, involving the application of
three patterns for secure design (Limited View, Role-Based Access Control, Secure State
Machine), presented in Chapter 4. Part 3 involves the development of teaching modules for
integrating security design patterns into lower-division computer science courses presented
in Chapter 5. Here, five such modules, related to integer overflow, input validation, HTTPS,
files access, and SQL injection, are proposed for helping future developers become aware of
patterns and their potential value in secure software development.
Decomposing security requirements into a hierarchy yields a three-level hierarchy. Secu-
rity, at the top, is decomposed into four non-functional requirements (NFR): confidentiality,
integrity, availability, and accountability. Further decomposition of these four NFRs results
in the third level with a total of eleven NFRS. Confidentiality is decomposed into authenti-
cation and authorization. Integrity is decomposed into completeness, precision, and validity.
80
Accountability is decomposed into logging, monitoring, and reporting. Availability is de-
composed into usability, reliability, and compatibility. This hierarchy can be used to solicit
a system’s quality attributes from stakeholders and to develop that system, based on as-
sociations between security NFRs and patterns that realize these requirements, relative to
different stages in the software development process
To evaluate the effectiveness of security design patterns, several patterns were applied
to the problem of redesigning a real-world application, the Online Tenure and Promotion
(OLTP) system. The use of these patterns in this system’s design yielded qualitative im-
provements in the redesigned system, as documented in Chapter 4.
Finally, the NFRs and security design patterns were used to develop teaching models
that illustrate the importance of security. These security teaching modules were developed
for five lower-division courses in ETSU’s computer science curriculum. The modules are
intended to illuminate material that is already being presented in those courses. Security
aspects with related practices or security design patterns are given with multiple activities
and objectives. All teaching modules have a discussion activity that requires students to
answer questions and do a modest amount of research. For classes that are programming
intensive, the teaching modules have programming activities that require students to break a
program by taking advantages of security flaws, then fix the program by applying knowledge
from the discussion activity.
Further Research
Additional research could be performed in several areas discussed in chapter two through
five. First, security issues could be decomposed at finer levels of detail to obtain more focused
questions for NFR elicitation. Second, additional patterns could be extracted from the
literature or developed to fill gaps in the security hierarchy. Third, all security design patterns
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could be tested to evaluate their effectiveness. Security design patterns could be evaluated on
how well they work together when addressing security non-functional requirements. Finally,
the teaching modules should be evaluated to assess their effectiveness. An analysis could be
performed on students that have taken courses with the security modules compared to those
that have taken classes without the security modules. This would require several semesters
to complete since modules cover several years of course work. Alternatively, analysis can be
performed with two classes being taught in the same term with one class having the security







Security Module Course Page
Integer Overflow CS1: Introduction to Programming I 85
File Access CS2: Introduction to Programming II 95
HTTPS WEB1: Introduction to Web Development 107
SQL Injection DB: Database Fundamentals 118
Input Validation WEB2: Server-side Development 126
84
Security Module: Integer Overflow
Description
Integer overflow is a security issue caused by overflowing a data type’s storage limitations. Integer overflow
occurs when arithmetic operation give a numeric value that is to big to be stored in integer variable.
Objective
The objectives of this security module are to illustrate the limitations that a data type can have and show
the consequences of integer overflow can have on your system data.
Activities
There are three activities for this module. The first is a discussion assignment, where students are given a
short narrative and questions covering integer overflow. Second, students are given a Java program they can
run that simulates a bank account. The program uses a command line interface. The account starts with an
initial balance of 0 dollars. The user has 3 options in the menu: deposit money, withdraw money, and exit.
The data type for storing the balance will be a short. Ask the student to attempt to break the program by
depositing and/or withdrawing money. Third, students are given the code for the previous assignment. They
are asked to modify the program to fix the security flaw caused by overflow. They can do this in two ways:
change the data type to be a long or check for max values before adding/subtracting the deposit/withdraw
amount.
Module Contents
 Assignment 1: Integer Overflow Discussion
 Assignment 2: Break the Program
 Assignment 3: Fix the Program w/source code
 Answer key for each assignment
 Source code for IntegerOverflow class
 Source code for Menu class (used in IntegerOverflow program)
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Assignment 1: Integer Overflow Discussion
What is Integer Overflow?
Integer overflow is a security issue is caused by overflowing a data type’s storage limitations. Integer overflow
occurs when arithmetic operations result in a numeric value that is to big to be stored in integer variable.
A physical example of this problem can be seen with your car’s odometer, which has only 6 dials. If your
car’s odometer is reading 999500 for having traveled 99,950.0 miles, what happens when you travel another
1000 miles? The odometer will roll over to 000500, resulting in the appearance of the car having only ever
traveled 500 miles. This is an mechanical example of the the integer overflow problem. Even though it’s the
“Integer Overflow” problem, it apples to all primitive data types.
This same principal can be applied to primitive data types, such as Java’s short data type. Short can only
store values between -32,768 and 32,767 inclusively. Let say you have the variable shortOdometerReading
defined as a short. If shortOdometerReading has a value of 31,890 and 3,000 was added to it. What would
be the value stored in shortOdometerReading? -30646 When storing a value the system will only use the
least significant bits that can be stored in a variable. Since the short data type can only store 16 bits
anything over 16 bits is ignored. This cause the value to wrap around to the lowest number it can store and
start counting up from there. Since the lowest value is -32,768 and the highest value is 32,767 the variable
will wrap around when it hits 32,768.
To demonstrate the limitations of the data type short the below code is given for you to analyze and
answer questions about.
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1 short myShort = 32765;
2
3 myShort = myShort + 1;
4 System.out.println(myShort);
5
6 myShort = myShort + 1;
7 System.out.println(myShort);
8
9 myShort = myShort + 1;
10 System.out.println(myShort);
11
12 myShort = myShort + 1;
13 System.out.println(myShort);
14
15 myShort = myShort + 1;
16 System.out.println(myShort);





2. What will be the result of the System.out.println(myShort) statements on lines 4, 7, 9, 13, 16?
3. Explain what happens when the value being stored in short is to large to fit in the data type.
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Assignment 2: Break the Program
In this assignment, you will be given a Java program for a simple bank account. This program will track the
balance for your account. You can deposit and withdraw money from your account using the command line
interface. To deposit money into your account, use option 1. The prompt will ask you “How much money
to deposit:”. You must input a positive number that will be added to your balance. To withdraw money
out of your account, use option 2. The prompt will again ask you, “How much money to withdraw”. You
must enter a positive number that will subtracted from your balance.
Your assignment is to try and break the simple bank program. As you try to break the program, keep
track of the amount you deposit or withdraw along with the expected balance and the actual balance. Hint:
try depositing or withdrawing large amounts of money.
1. Did you have an actual balance that did not match your expected balance?
2. If yes, what was your actual balance and your expected balance?
3. Based on the values from the previous question, can you determine the date type being used to store
the balance? What is that type?
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Assignment 3: Fix the Program
The next page has the source code from the previous assignment, where you were asked to break the simple
bank program. Your assignment is to identify what needs to be modified in the source code to fix the overflow
problem. Use your answers from the previous assignment to help you identify three locations in the code
needing modification. When asked to identify a line of code, provide the line number.
1. What data type is used to store the balance?
2. What other data types could be used to store the balance and why?
3. What is the first line of code that needs modified? What do you suggest it be changed to?
4. What is the second line of code that needs modified? What do you suggest it be changed to?









8 public static void main(String[] args)
9 {
10 Scanner in = new Scanner(System.in);
11 short balance = 0;
12
13 Menu menu = new Menu(”Main Menu”);
14 menu.addOption(1, ”Deposit Money”);










25 System.out.print(”How much to deposit: ”);
26 short depositAmount = in.nextShort();






33 System.out.print(”How much to withdraw: ”);
34 short withdrawAmount = in.nextShort();
















Assignment 1: Integer Overflow Discussion
1. Choose the two answers that equal the minimum and maximum values that a short can store?
(b) -32,768 and (d) 32,767
2. What will be the result of the System.out.println(myShort) statements on lines 4, 7, 9, 13, 16?
32766, 32767, -32768, -32767, -32766
3. Explain what happens when the value being stored in short is to large to fit in the data type.
Arithmetic operations that result in a number to large for a given data type result in high
order bits being discarded. The short data type only has 16 bits to represent a value. If
a value needs more than 16 bits to be store, everything over 16 bits is discarded when
being stored. This can corrupt your data.
Assignment 2: Break the Program
1. Did you have an actual balance that did not match your expected balance?
The student should deposit or withdraw money until this occurs.
2. If yes, what was your actual balance and your expected balance?
The student will have a discrepancy when he/she its the short’s storage limit (-32,768 or
32767)
3. Can you determine the date type being used to store the balance? What is that type?
The student should be able to determine that the data type being used is a short.
Assignment 3: Fix the Program
1. What data type is used to store the balance?
short
2. What other data types could be used to store the balance and why?
integer or double, both would allow for a much larger number to be stored
3. What is the first line of code that needs modified? What do you suggest it be changed to?
Line 11 should be changed to short int = 0
4. What is the second line of code that needs modified? What do you suggest it be changed to?
Line 26 should be changed to int depositAmount = in.nextInt()
5. What is the third line of code that needs modified? What do you suggest it be changed to?









public static void main(String[] args)
{
Scanner in = new Scanner(System.in);
short balance = 0;











System.out.print(”How much to deposit: ”);






System.out.print(”How much to withdraw: ”);









































this._subMenus = new HashMap<Integer, Menu>();



















System.out.println(” ” + this._title + ”\n”);
for (Option option : this._options) {





String optionStr = in.nextLine();
//−−− Attempt to convert the inputed string to an integer
try {
optionInt = Integer.parseInt(optionStr);
} catch (NumberFormatException ex) {
System.out.println(”Error: It appears you did not input a option number”);
continue;
}
//−−− Check if the option exists in our menu
for (Option option : this._options) {









Security Module: File Access
Description
File access has many security issues including pathnames, permissions, and race conditions. Pathnames can
be vulnerable to symbolic links or directory walking using “..” , the path to the directory above. Permissions
may allow a user to delete files without proper authorization. Race conditions can allow other processes to
insert data into a system by writing to application files while a program is processing the same file.
Objective
The objectives of this security module are to illustrate and explain security issues associated with file access
and the consequences file access can have on your system’s data.
Activities
There are three activities for this module. The first is a discussion assignment on pathname canonicalization,
the practice of ensuring that all files are referred to by a valid canonical path. Second, students are given
a Java program that simulates a bank account. This program will use a file to store account information.
The program uses a command line interface. The user has 3 options in the menu: open account file, display
account info, and exit. The student will investigate security issues associated with pathname vulnerabilities.
Third, students are given the code for the simulation above. They are asked to modify the program to fix
the security flaw caused by pathname vulnerable.
Module Contents
 Assignment 1: File Access Discussion
 Assignment 2: Break the Program
 Assignment 3: Fix the Program w/source code
 Answer key for each assignment
 Source code for FileAccess class
 Source code for Menu class (used in FileAccess program)
 Complete source code for solution to Assignment 3
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Assignment 1: File Access Discussion
File Access
File Access can be a very important part of an application. It can be used load configuration, take input,
or store user data. There are a number of security issues when dealing with files, such as race conditions,
pathnames, and file permissions. Race conditions can occur if you have multiple programs using the same
file. If two programs read data from the same file, then perform calculations on the data, the last program
to write back the calculated value will win. Pathname issues can expose data that the user may not be
intended to access. For example, if we trust the user to input the pathname for a file to be read, this could
allow the user to walk up the directory tree to other files. File permissions can cause programs to crash if it
does not have the appropriate permissions to open the file.
This assignment will concentrate on vulnerabilities involving pathnames. Use the following directory











1. What is the absolute path to the folder that contains the doe.data file?
2. What is the absolute path to the folder that contains the mydoe.data file?
3. If you are in the /program/ folder, what is relative path used to change to the /mydata/ folder?
4. If you run the FileAccess java program what is the absolute path to your working directory?
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Assignment 2: Break the Program
In this assignment, you will be given a Java program for a simple bank account. This program uses files to
store account information. You can load account files and display account information using the command
line. To load an account file, use option 1. The prompt will ask you for the “Account file name:”. You
must input a file name that represents the account you wish to load. To display the account information,
use option 2. Once the program displays the account information, you will be returned to the menu, where
you can load a different account file. You will be given a zip archive containing the simple bank account
program. Below is the directory structure contained in the zip archive. The .data files located in the program
directory represent the files where account information is stored. The .data files have the account holder’s
name in the first line and the account balance in the second line. As users of the program, the .data files are






Your assignment is to trick the program into loading data files that we do have access to. To accomplish
this create a new folder in the root folder, not in the program folder. Then, create a .data file with your
name as in the first line and your desired balance in line two. For this assignment, keep the balance below
$1 million dollars. When the program asks you to enter the account’s file name, use doe.data the first time.
Then attempt to have the program load the file you created.
1. What is the balance of John Doe’s account when you used the doe.data file?
2. What is the filename you uses to get the program to use your version of doe.data? (The previous
assignment should be a hint)
3. What balance does the program think John Doe’s account has when using your version of the doe.data?
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Assignment 3: Fix the Program
In this assignment, you will fix the source code from the previous assignment to account for file path
vulnerabilities. There may be several approaches to this problem. The one suggested here is to compare the
absolute directory to ensure it matches the expected path. To do this you will use the Path class provided
by Java. This class is the java.nio package available only in Java 7 or higher. Java provides a tutorial on
Path operations here - http://docs.oracle.com/javase/tutorial/essential/io/pathOps.html. The javadocs for
Path is located here - http://docs.oracle.com/javase/7/docs/api/java/nio/file/Path.html. Pseudo code for
the solution is presented below.
The solution will need to be added after the program creates the File object on line 33. Use the
strFilePath to create a Path object via the Paths.gets() method. Pay attention to the parameters needed
by the Paths.gets() method. Use the websites provided earlier for documentation.
GET FILE PATH FOR FILE (Hint: use Paths.gets() method)
GET ABSOLUTE PATH FOR FILE PATH
GET PARENT DIR FOR THE FILE ABSOLUTE PATH
GET APP PATH FOR WORKING DIRECTORY
GET ABSOLUTE PATH FOR APP PATH
GET PARENT DIR FOR APP ABSOLUTE PATH
IF FILE’S PARENT DIR NOT EQUAL APP’S PARENT DIR
— DISPLAY ERROR
— BREAK
1. Test your solution to ensure that it works.
2. Turn in a screen shot of the program accessing the original doe.data file.




Assignment 1: File Access Discussion
1. What is the absolute path to the folder that contains the doe.data file?
/program/doe.data
2. What is the absolute path to the folder that contains the mydoe.data file?
/mydata/doe.data
3. If you are in the /program/ folder, what is relative path used to change to the /mydata/ folder?
../mydata
4. If you run the FileAccess java program what is the absolute path to your working directory?
../program
Assignment 2: Break the Program
1. What is the balance of John Doe’s account when you used the doe.data file?
$1 hundred dollars
2. What is the filename you uses to get the program to use your version of doe.data?
../mydata (assuming the student used the same structure as assignment 1)
3. What balance does the program think John Doe’s account has when using your version of the doe.data?
(will be different per student)
Assignment 3: Fix the Program
The following code is one possible solution. A full solution is given at the end of this module.
1 //−−− Get absolute path of the folder containing the file given
2 Path filePathObject = Paths.get(fileIn.getPath());
3 Path fileLocation = filePathObject.toAbsolutePath().getParent();
4 //−−− Get absolute path to the folder the application is running in
5 Path appPathObject = Paths.get(”.”);
6 Path appLocation = appPathObject.toAbsolutePath().getParent();
7 //−−− If the app location doesn't match the file location, error and break
8 if ( !appLocation.equals(fileLocation) ) {









public static void main(String[] args) {
Scanner in = new Scanner(System.in);
Menu menu = new Menu(”Main Menu”);
menu.addOption(1, ”Open Account File”);
menu.addOption(2, ”Display Account Info”);
menu.addOption(9, ”Exit”);
String name = null;







System.out.print(”Account file name: ”);
String fileName = in.nextLine();
try {
File fileIn = new File(fileName);
String strFilePath = fileIn.getPath();
System.out.print(”\nAttempting to open file at ” + strFilePath);
name = file.nextLine();
balance = file.nextLine();
} catch (Exception e) {






if ( null == name ) {
System.out.print(”\nError: account file not loaded”);
} else {
System.out.print(”\nName : ” + name);












































this._subMenus = new HashMap<Integer, Menu>();



















System.out.println(” ” + this._title + ”\n”);
for (Option option : this._options) {





String optionStr = in.nextLine();
//−−− Attempt to convert the inputed string to an integer
try {
optionInt = Integer.parseInt(optionStr);
} catch (NumberFormatException ex) {
System.out.println(”Error: It appears you did not input a option number”);
continue;
}
//−−− Check if the option exists in our menu
for (Option option : this._options) {













public static void main(String[] args) {
Scanner in = new Scanner(System.in);
Menu menu = new Menu(”Main Menu”);
menu.addOption(1, ”Open Account File”);
menu.addOption(2, ”Display Account Info”);
menu.addOption(9, ”Exit”);
String name = null;








System.out.print(”Account file name: ”);
String fileName = in.nextLine();
try {
File fileIn = new File(fileName);
String strFilePath = fileIn.getPath();
System.out.print(”\nAttempting to open file at ” + strFilePath);
//−−− Get absolute path of the folder containing the file given
Path filePathObject = Paths.get(fileIn.getPath());
Path fileLocation = filePathObject.toAbsolutePath().getParent();
//−−− Get absolute path to the folder the application is running in
Path appPathObject = Paths.get(”.”);
Path appLocation = appPathObject.toAbsolutePath().getParent();
//−−− If the app location doesn't match the file location, error and break
if ( !appLocation.equals(fileLocation) ) {






} catch (Exception e) {






if ( null == name ) {
System.out.print(”\nError: account file not loaded”);
} else {
System.out.print(”\nName : ” + name);


















Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) extends the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) by placing
the HTTP layer on top of the Secure Socket Layer/Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS) layer. By using
HTTP on top of SSL/TLS, web servers can use authentication to check validity of requests to protect against
man-in-the-middle attacks.
Objective
The objective of this security module is to discuss security issues associated with making requests over the
internet using HTTPS and the vulnerability of sending requests using HTTP.
Activities
There is only one activity for this module. The activity involves a narrative explaining HTTPS with the
advantage and disadvantages of using HTTPS. The student will be given several questions to answer about
this narrative along with some questions that will requires internet research.
Module Contents
 Assignment 1: HTTPS Discussion
 Answer key the assignment
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Assignment 1: HTTPS Discussion
Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) is an extension of the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP)
that adds security by using Secure Socket Layer/Transport Layer Security SSL/TLS. By using HTTPS,
users of the internet can verify that servers are who they say they are, and they can be protected from man-
in-the-middle attacks. These attacks include eavesdropping to steal sensitive information, such as a user’s
bank account credentials, and inject new messages that may contain spyware or malware. HTTPS uses the
same uniform resource identifier (URI) scheme as HTTP with the exception of the scheme identifier at the
beginning of the URL. When using https:// instead of http://, the broswer will encrypt requests via the
SSL/TLS layer. The request URL, query parameters, headers, and cookies are all encrypted. The addresses
and ports numbers can not be encrypted, since they are used to route the request to the appropriate server.
To use HTTPS, the server is required to have a public key certificate created by an administrator. This
certificate will be signed using a private key of a trusted certificate authority (CA). When a request is made
by the web broswer (client), the certificate is retrieved and then verified using the public key for the CA.
Web browsers will be installed with all major CAs’ public keys. The web browser then creates a shared key
that is sent back to the server to ensure all communication between the web browser (client) and server is
encrypted and therefore protected. The CA is providing services that prevent man-in-the-middle attacks.
Since HTTPS has to encrypt sent messages and decrypt received messages, communication between the
client and server can be slower than it would be using just HTTP. This is especially true because all pages
of a website need to use HTTPS if the connection needs to be secure. This includes retrieving all images,
cascading style sheets (CSS), and Javascript files.
The following questions can be answered using the above narrative or by a little online research.
1. In a few sentences, describe what HTTPS is.
2. Why should one use HTTPS over HTTP?
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3. How does HTTPS work?
4. What does HTTPS protect us from? Give at least two things.
5. What is needed to use HTTPS?
6. Name at least one major trusted certificate authority.
7. What ports do HTTP and HTTPS use?
8. Give one difference between HTTP and HTTPS?
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Answer Key
Assignment 1: HTTPS Discussion
1. In a few sentences, describe what HTTPS is.
HTTPS is an extension of HTTP to add security. This is done by layering HTTP on top
of SSL/TLS to encrypt requests sent between clients and server.
2. Why should one use HTTPS over HTTP
If a site only uses HTTP then sensitive information is passed around in plain text. At-
tackers can intercept messages and view information such as your username/password or
bank account information.
3. How does HTTPS work?
When using a secure connection with HTTPS everything is encrypted. This includes the
request URL, query parameters, headers, and cookies. The host address and port num-
bers can not be encrypted since they are needed to route the request to the appropriate
server.
4. What does HTTPS protect us from? Give at least two things.
HTTPS protects us from man-in-the-middle attacks that can inject information into or
change requests. Requests could have malware or ads injected by attackers. Packet
sniffers can also steal information from request such as username/passwords, bank account
information, etc.
5. What is needed to use HTTPS?
The server must have a public key certificate that is signed by a trusted certificate au-
thority. The client (browser) must have the abilities to retrieve the key from the server
and use certificate authorities to validate key. This implies that the client must trust the
certificate authority.
6. Name at least one major trusted certificate authority.
Symantec (VeriSign, Thawte,and Geotrust), Comodo, GoDaddy, and GlobalSign sign
almost 90 percent of all certificates on the internet.
7. What ports do HTTP and HTTPS use?
HTTP uses port 80 and HTTPS uses port 443.
8. What is one difference between HTTP and HTTPS
HTTP use port 80 while HTTPS uses port 443. HTTP uses http:// while HTTPS uses
https://. HTTPS can be slower than HTTP.
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Security Module: SQL Injection
Description
SQL injection is a security issue that involves inserting malicious code into requests made to a database.
The security vulnerability occurs when user provided data is not correctly validated or filtered. Failure to
account for SQL injection can result in sensitive data being be stolen or in unauthorized access.
Objective
The objectives of this security module are to illustrate and explain security issues associated with SQL
injection and the consequences that not protecting against SQL injection can have on your system.
Activities
There are three activities for this module. The first is a discussion assignment on SQL injection and the
practice of sanitizing user input to protect your database from attackers. Second, students are given a Java
program that simulates a bank account. This program will use a database to store account information.
The program uses a command line interface that displays the account available. The user has two options
in the menu: view account and exit. The view account option will ask for the name of an account to view.
The student is asked to add another account using SQL injection. Third, students are given the code for the
simulation above. They are asked to modify the program to fix the security flaw caused by SQL injection.
Module Contents
 Assignment 1: SQL Injection Discussion
 Assignment 2: Break the Program
 Assignment 3: Fix the Program w/source code
 Answer key for each assignment
 Source code for SQLInjection class
 Source code for Menu class (used in SQLInjection program)
 Complete source code for solution to Assignment 3
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Assignment 1: SQL Injection Discussion
SQL Injection
SQL injection is an attack techenique often used against data driven applications. This type of attack
attempts to take advantage of poor programming practices to gain unauthorized access to databases. At-
tackers that gain access can alter or remove data from the database, affecting application operation. To
protect against SQL injection attacks, developers must use best practices. The first practice for avoiding
SQL injection is to assume all input is evil. This means do not trust input from users, files, or other pro-
grams. The second practice is to never use dynamic SQL, SQL that is constructed by concatenating SQL
using user-provided values. The third practice is to never connect to the database with administrative level
privileges that is, do not connect with root accounts. The fourth practice is do not store secrets in plain
text. This means do not store user’s passwords in plain text, encrypt the password before storing in the
database. The fifth practice is that exceptions should display minimal information. Exceptions can display
connection inforomation such as the database’s username and password.
The following questions should be answered using the narrative above and using research conducted on
the internet.
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1. What are the five practices listed above?
2. What techniques could you use to implement the first practice?
3. What is dynamic SQL? Give an example using Java.
4. Explain the process of encrypting a user’s password with a salt. Note: this password is stored in the
database.
5. Why should you use a salt when encrypting passwords?
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Assignment 2: Break the Program
In this assignment, you are given a Java program for a simple bank account. This program uses a database
to store account information. You can load accounts and display account information using the command
line interface. To load account information, use option 1. The prompt will display all acounts in the system.
To load an account, you must input the account number. Once the account has been displayed, you will be
returned to the main menu. The purpose of this assingment is to show how SQL injection can be used to
alter a system’s data. The database structure is given below for the account table.
Table Field Data Type Nulls Unsign P Key Uniq F Key Comments
account id int(11) Y Y The account id
name varchar(45) The account holder’s name
balance double The account balance
Your assignment will be to use SQL injection to modifty the database. Using SQL injection add an
additional account with your name and an inital balance of $10,000 dollars. Verify that your account has
been added to the system, then update your account to have $1,000,000 dollars.
1. At what point in the interface, can SQL injection be used?
2. What did you input to have the system insert your account?
3. What did you input to have the system update your account?
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Assignment 3: Fix the Program
In this assignment, you will fix the source code from the previous assignment to protect the system against
SQL injection. There may be serveral approaches to protect the system. Consider the first practice discussed
in assignement 1: assume all input is evil. The only way to protect against all SQL injection is to use
parameterized queries. Parameterized queires are prepared SQL statements that are built using parameters,
not the user’s input data. This technique should always be used when using user inputed data to retrieve
data from a database.
Using Java’s documentation on paramaterized query, alter the getAccount method to protect against
SQL injection. http://docs.oracle.com/javase/6/docs/api/java/sql/PreparedStatement.html
1. Test your solution to ensure that it works.
2. Turn in a screen shot of the program with you trying to use SQL injection to add another account.




Assignment 1: SQL Injection Discussion
1. What are the five practices listed above?
1) Assume all input is evil
2) Never use dynamic SQL
3) Never connect to database with admin level privileges
4) Don’t store secrets (password) in plain text
5) Exceptions should display minimal information
2. What techniques could you use to implement the first practice?
Sanatize user input at the application level.
Use prepared statements for accessing the database.
3. What is dynamic SQL? Give an example using Java.
Dynamic SQL is SQL that is created at runtime using user input.
4. Explain the process of encrypting a user’s password with a salt.
A salt is random data added to the user’s password to increase security when encrypting
the password to be stored.
5. Why should you use a salt when encrypting passwords?
Adding a salt to the user’s password before encrypting will protect agianst pre-compiled
tables used to attack system. (Rainbow tables)
Assignment 2: Break the Program
1. At what point in the interface, can SQL injection be used?
When the user is required to enter the account number.
2. What did you input to have the system insert your account?
If selecting account with account number 1.
1; insert into account values (5, ’John Doe’, 10000);
3. What did you input to have the system update your account?
1; update table set balance = 1000000000 where id = 5;
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Assignment 3: Fix the Program
The following code is one possible solution. A full solution is given at the end of this module.
Alter the getAccount method to have the following code.
private static Account getAccount(String id) {
Account account = null;
PreparedStatement selectAccount = null;
String selectAccountString = ”select * from account where id = ?”;
try {
Connection conn = getConnection();
selectAccount = conn.prepareStatement(selectAccountString);
selectAccount.setInt(1, Integer.parseInt(id)); // 1 references the first (and
only) ? in the prepared stmt
selectAccount.execute();
ResultSet rs = selectAccount.getResultSet();
if ( rs.next() ) {
account = new Account(rs.getInt(”id”), rs.getString(”name”), rs.getInt(
”balance”));
}
} catch (Exception e) {








public static void main(String[] args) {
Scanner in = new Scanner(System.in);










System.out.printf(”\n\n\t%−10s : %s”, ”Account Id”, ”Account Holder”);
System.out.println(”\n
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−”);
for (Account account : getAccountList()) {
System.out.printf(”\t%10s : %s\n”, account.id, account.name);
}
System.out.print(”\n\nSelect id for acount to be viewed: ”);
String accountId = in.nextLine();
Account account = getAccount(accountId);
if ( account != null ) {
System.out.printf(”\n\t%15s : %s”, ”Account Id”, account.id);
System.out.printf(”\n\t%15s : %s”, ”Account Holder”, account.name);
System.out.printf(”\n\t%15s : %s”, ”Balance”, account.balance);
} else {
System.out.print(”\nAccount with ” + accountId + ” does not exist”);
}














private static ArrayList<Account> getAccountList() {
ArrayList<Account> accounts = new ArrayList<Account>();
try {
Connection conn = getConnection();
Statement stmt = conn.createStatement();




} catch (Exception e) {




private static Account getAccount(String id) {
Account account = null;
try {
Connection conn = getConnection();
Statement stmt = conn.createStatement();
String strStmt = ”select id, name, balance from account where id = ” + id;
stmt.execute(strStmt);
ResultSet rs = stmt.getResultSet();
if ( rs.next() ) {
account = new Account(rs.getInt(”id”), rs.getString(”name”), rs.getInt(”balance”))
;
}
} catch (Exception e) {




private static Connection getConnection() {





} catch (Exception e) {
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public int balance = 0;
public int id;
public String name;





































this._subMenus = new HashMap<Integer, Menu>();



















System.out.println(” ” + this._title + ”\n”);
for (Option option : this._options) {





String optionStr = in.nextLine();
//−−− Attempt to convert the inputed string to an integer
try {
optionInt = Integer.parseInt(optionStr);
} catch (NumberFormatException ex) {
System.out.println(”Error: It appears you did not input a option number”);
continue;
}
//−−− Check if the option exists in our menu
for (Option option : this._options) {











public static void main(String[] args) {
Scanner in = new Scanner(System.in);











System.out.printf(”\n\n\t%−10s : %s”, ”Account Id”, ”Account Holder”);
System.out.println(”\n
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−”);
for (Account account : getAccountList()) {
System.out.printf(”\t%10s : %s\n”, account.id, account.name);
}
System.out.print(”\n\nSelect id for acount to be viewed: ”);
String accountId = in.nextLine();
Account account = getAccount(accountId);
if ( account != null ) {
System.out.printf(”\n\t%15s : %s”, ”Account Id”, account.id);
System.out.printf(”\n\t%15s : %s”, ”Account Holder”, account.name);
System.out.printf(”\n\t%15s : %s”, ”Balance”, account.balance);
} else {
System.out.print(”\nAccount with ” + accountId + ” does not exist”);
}













private static ArrayList<Account> getAccountList() {
ArrayList<Account> accounts = new ArrayList<Account>();
try {
Connection conn = getConnection();
Statement stmt = conn.createStatement();




} catch (Exception e) {




}private static Account getAccount(String id) {
Account account = null;
PreparedStatement selectAccount = null;
String selectAccountString = ”select * from account where id = ?”;
try {
Connection conn = getConnection();
selectAccount = conn.prepareStatement(selectAccountString);
selectAccount.setInt(1, Integer.parseInt(id)); // 1 references the first (and only) ? in the
prepared stmt
selectAccount.execute();
ResultSet rs = selectAccount.getResultSet();
if ( rs.next() ) {
account = new Account(rs.getInt(”id”), rs.getString(”name”), rs.getInt(”balance”))
;
}
} catch (Exception e) {




private static Connection getConnection() {





} catch (Exception e) {






public int balance = 0;
public int id;
public String name;












Security Module: Input Validation
Description
Input validation is a technique for validating all input before using it. An application that assumes input
from the user is valid opens itself up to security vulnerabilities. Issues with data consistency render a system’s
data useless. User input that queries a database may contain malicious SQL that can alter the database in
undesirables ways.
Objective
The objectives of this security module are to illustrate and explain the importance of input validation and
the consequences that not validating data can have on a your system.
Activities
There are two activities for this module. This module is targeted at a server-side development class that
uses PHP. The first activity is a discussion assignment over input validation and methods that can be used
to achieve input validation. Second, students are given a PHP script that simulates a sign-up form for an
online account. Students are asked to test the form and add input validation logic.
Module Contents
 Assignment 1: Input Validation Discussion
 Assignment 2: Add Proper Validation
 Answer key for each assignment
 Source code for InputValidation script
 Complete source code for solution to Assignment 3
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Assignment 1: Input Validation Discussion
Input Validation
Input validation is a term use to describe the process of validating all input before using it. An applica-
tion that assumes input from the user is valid opens itself up to security vulnerabilities. Issues with data
consistency render a system’s data useless. User input that queries a database may contain malicious SQL
that can alter the database in undesirables ways. Input validation starts by defining the data that will be
collected from users. By defining the data, developers can validate the input data to ensure that it meets
specifications.
The following is an example specification used for defining a sign-up form.
Field Name Data Type Required Constraints
Username Text Yes Consist of characters a-z, A-Z, and 0-9
Length between 6 and 20 (inclusive)
Email Address Text Yes Must be a valid email
Username@domain.com
First Name Text Yes Consist of characters a-z and A-Z
Length between 2 and 24 (inclusive)
Last Name Text Yes Consist of characters a-z and A-Z
Length between 2 and 24 (inclusive)
Age Number Yes Number that must between 18 and 110 inclusive
Must be 18 or over
Address Line 1 Text Yes Consist of characters a-z and A-Z
Length between 2 and 48 (inclusive)
Address Line 2 Text No Consist of characters a-z and A-Z
Length between 2 and 48 (inclusive)
City Text Yes Consist of characters a-z and A-Z
Length between 2 and 48 (inclusive)
US Zipcode Integer Yes Consist of numbers
Length equal to 5
State Text Yes Must be one of the 50 states
Table 1: Sign-up form specification
The following questions can be answered using the above narrative, specification table, and online PHP
documentation.
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1. What is the benefit of creating a specification for form data?
2. What PHP function can be used to check the length of a variable?
3. What PHP function can be used to perform a regex match? What is the regex to check for a-z, A-Z,
or 0-9?
4. What PHP function can be used to check if variable is a number?
5. What PHP array function can be used to check if a value is in an array?
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Assignment 2: Add Proper Validation
In this assignment, you will be given access to a fake sign-up form that will require certain information.
Once you submit the form, the information will be presented back to you as you entered it. The form does
no validation checks on the data provided. Your assignment is to add proper validation logic and thoroughly
test against the form specifications.
Field Name Data Type Required Constraints
Username Text Yes Consist of characters a-z, A-Z, and 0-9
Length between 6 and 20 (inclusive)
Email Address Text Yes Must be a valid email
Username@domain.com
First Name Text Yes Consist of characters a-z and A-Z
Length between 2 and 24 (inclusive)
Last Name Text Yes Consist of characters a-z and A-Z
Length between 2 and 24 (inclusive)
Age Number Yes Number that must between 18 and 110 inclusive
Must be 18 or over
Address Line 1 Text Yes Consist of characters a-z and A-Z
Length between 2 and 48 (inclusive)
Address Line 2 Text No Consist of characters a-z and A-Z
Length between 2 and 48 (inclusive)
City Text Yes Consist of characters a-z and A-Z
Length between 2 and 48 (inclusive)
US Zipcode Integer Yes Consist of numbers
Length equal to 5
State Text Yes Must be one of the 50 states
Table 2: Sign-up form specification
1. Test your solution to ensure that it works.
2. Turn in a screen shot of the sign-up form with invalid data showing that the form accepts invalid data.
3. Turn in a screen shot of the sign-up form with valid data.
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Answer Key
Assignment 1: Input Validation Discussion
1. What is the benefit of creating a specification for form data?
A specification defines what validation needs to be performed on form fields.
2. What PHP function can be used to check the length of a variable?
strlen
3. What PHP function can be used to perform a regex match? What is the regex to check for a-z, A-Z,
or 0-9?
preg match
4. What PHP function can be used to check if variable is a number?
is numeric
5. What PHP array function can be used to check if a value is in an array?
is array ^[a-zA-Z ]*$ (Notice: a space is after Z)
Assignment 2: Add Proper Validation
A full solution is given at the end of this module.
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Input Validation Source Code
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC ”−//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN” ”http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/
DTD/xhtml1−strict.dtd”>
<?php
$states = array( ”Alabama”, ”Alaska”, ”Arizona”, ”Arkansas”, ”California”, ”Colorado”, ”
Connecticut”, ”Delaware”, ”District Of Columbia”, ”Florida”, ”Georgia”, ”Hawaii”, ”Idaho”, ”
Illinois”, ”Indiana”, ”Iowa”, ”Kansas”, ”Kentucky”, ”Louisiana”, ”Maine”, ”Maryland”, ”
Massachusetts”, ”Michigan”, ”Minnesota”, ”Mississippi”, ”Missouri”, ”Montana”,”Nebraska”,”
Nevada”,”New Hampshire”,”New Jersey”, ”New Mexico”, ”New York”, ”North Carolina”, ”North
Dakota”, ”Ohio”, ”Oklahoma”, ”Oregon”, ”Pennsylvania”, ”Rhode Island”, ”South Carolina”, ”
South Dakota”,”Tennessee”, ”Texas”, ”Utah”, ”Vermont”, ”Virginia”, ”Washington”, ”West
Virginia”, ”Wisconsin”, ”Wyoming” );
$isPost = false;





















<!−− If the request is a POST then show data −−>
<?php if ($isPost) : ?>
<table style=”width: 400px; margin: 50px auto 0 auto;”>
<tr>
<td>Username:</td>





































<td><?php echo $state ?></td>
</tr>
</table>
<!−− Else show the form−−>
<?php else: ?>
<form action=”” id=”subscription−form” method=”post” style=”width: 400px;
margin: 100px auto 0 auto;”>
<label for=”username”>Username</label><br />
<input id=”username” name=”username” size=”16” /><br /><br />
<label for=”email”>Email Address</label><br />
<input id=”email” name=”email” size=”16” /><br /><br />
<label for=”firstname”>First Name</label><br />
<input id=”firstname” name=”firstname” size=”16” /><br /><br />
<label for=”lastname”>Last Name</label><br />
<input id=”lastname” name=”lastname” size=”16” /><br /><br />
<label for=”age”>Age</label><br />
<input id=”age” name=”age” size=”8” /><br /><br />
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<label for=”address1”>Address Line 1</label><br />
<input id=”address1” name=”address1” size=”32” /><br /><br />
<label for=”address2”>Address Line 2</label><br />
<input id=”address2” name=”address2” size=”32” /><br /><br />
<label for=”city”>City</label><br />
<input id=”city” name=”city” size=”16” /><br /><br />
<label for=”zipcode”>US Zipcode</label><br />
<input id=”zipcode” name=”zipcode” size=”16” /><br /><br />
<label for=”state”>State</label><br />
<select id=”state” name=”state”>
<?php foreach ($states as $state) : ?>
<option value=”<?php echo $state?>”><?php echo $state?></option>
<?php endforeach; ?>
</select><br /><br />







Input Validation Solution Source Code
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC ”−//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN” ”http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/
DTD/xhtml1−strict.dtd”>
<?php
$states = array( ”Alabama”, ”Alaska”, ”Arizona”, ”Arkansas”, ”California”, ”Colorado”, ”
Connecticut”,
”Delaware”, ”District Of Columbia”, ”Florida”, ”Georgia”, ”Hawaii”, ”Idaho”, ”Illinois”,
”Indiana”, ”Iowa”, ”Kansas”, ”Kentucky”, ”Louisiana”, ”Maine”, ”Maryland”, ”
Massachusetts”,
”Michigan”, ”Minnesota”, ”Mississippi”, ”Missouri”, ”Montana”, ”Nebraska”, ”Nevada”,
”New Hampshire”, ”New Jersey”, ”New Mexico”, ”New York”, ”North Carolina”, ”North
Dakota”,
”Ohio”, ”Oklahoma”, ”Oregon”, ”Pennsylvania”, ”Rhode Island”, ”South Carolina”, ”South
Dakota”,
”Tennessee”, ”Texas”, ”Utah”, ”Vermont”, ”Virginia”, ”Washington”, ”West Virginia”,
”Wisconsin”, ”Wyoming” );



























//−−− Validate username (is string; between 6 and 20; contains only a−z, A−Z, or 0−9
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if ($username != null) {
if (!is string($username)) {
$errorMessages[] = 'Username must be a string';
}
if (strlen($username) < 6 || strlen($username) > 20) {
$errorMessages[] = 'Username must be between 8 and 20 characters long (inclusive)';
}
if (!preg match('/ˆ[a−zA−Z0−9]*$/', $username)) {
$errorMessages[] = 'Username can only contain a−z, A−Z, or 0−9';
}
} else {
$errorMessages[] = 'Username is a required field';
}
//−−− Validate email (is string; valid email address)
if ($email != null) {
if (!is string($email)) {
$errorMessages[] = 'Email must be a string';
}
if (!filter_var($email, FILTER_VALIDATE_EMAIL)) {
$errorMessages[] = 'Email must be a valid email address';
}
} else {
$errorMessages[] = 'Email Address is a required field';
}
//−−− Validate firstName (is string; between 2 and 24; contains only a−z, A−Z
if ($firstName != null) {
if (!is string($firstName)) {
$errorMessages[] = 'First Name must be a string';
}
if (strlen($firstName) < 2 || strlen($firstName) > 24) {
$errorMessages[] = 'First Name must be between 2 and 24 characters long (inclusive)';
}
if (!preg match('/ˆ[a−zA−Z]*$/', $firstName)) {
$errorMessages[] = 'First Name can only contain a−z or A−Z';
}
} else {
$errorMessages[] = 'First Name is a required field';
}
//−−− Validate lastName (is string; between 2 and 24; contains only a−z, A−Z)
if ($lastName != null) {
if (!is string($lastName)) {
$errorMessages[] = 'Last Name must be a string';
}
if (strlen($lastName) < 2 || strlen($lastName) > 24) {
$errorMessages[] = 'Last Name must be between 2 and 24 characters long (inclusive)';
}
if (!preg match('/ˆ[a−zA−Z]*$/', $lastName)) {




$errorMessages[] = 'Last Name is a required field';
}
//−−− Validate age (is number; between 18 and 110)
if ($age != null) {
if (!is numeric($age)) {
$errorMessages[] = 'Age must be a number';
}
if ($age < 18 || $age > 110) {
$errorMessages[] = 'Age must be between 18 and 110 characters long (inclusive)';
}
} else {
$errorMessages[] = 'Age is a required field';
}
//−−− Validate address line 1 (is string, between 2 and 48; contains only a−z, A−Z, or 0−9)
if ($address1 != null) {
if (!is string($address1)) {
$errorMessages[] = 'Address Line 1 must be a string';
}
if (strlen($address1) < 2 || strlen($address1) > 48) {
$errorMessages[] = 'Address Line 1 must be between 2 and 48 characters long (inclusive)
';
}
if (!preg match('/ˆ[a−zA−Z0−9 ]*$/', $address1)) {
$errorMessages[] = 'Address Line 1 can only contain a−z, A−Z, or 0−9';
}
} else {
$errorMessages[] = 'Address Line 1 is a required field';
}
//−−− Validate address line 2 (is string, between 2 and 48; contains only a−z, A−Z, or 0−9)
//−−− not a required field
if ($address2 != null) {
if (!is string($address2)) {
$errorMessages[] = 'Address Line 2 must be a string';
}
if (strlen($address1) < 2 || strlen($address2) > 48) {
$errorMessages[] = 'Address Line 2 must be between 2 and 48 characters long (inclusive)
';
}
if (!preg match('/ˆ[a−zA−Z0−9 ]*$/', $address2)) {
$errorMessages[] = 'Address Line 2 can only contain a−z, A−Z, or 0−9';
}
}
//−−− Validate city (is string, between 2 and 48; contains only a−z or A−Z)
if ($city != null) {
if (!is string($city)) {
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$errorMessages[] = 'City must be a string';
}
if (strlen($city) < 2 || strlen($city) > 48) {
$errorMessages[] = 'City must be between 2 and 48 characters long (inclusive)';
}
if (!preg match('/ˆ[a−zA−Z ]*$/', $city)) {
$errorMessages[] = 'City can only contain a−z, A−Z, or 0−9';
}
} else {
$errorMessages[] = 'City is a required field';
}
//−−− Validate zipcode (is number, exactly 5 digits long);
if ($zipcode != null) {
if (!is numeric($zipcode)) {
$errorMessages[] = 'Zipcode must be a number';
}
if (strlen($zipcode) != 5) {
$errorMessages[] = 'Zipcode must be exactly 5 digits long';
}
} else {
$errorMessages[] = 'Zipcode is a required field';
}
//−−− Validate state (is number, exactly 5 digits long;
if ($state != null) {
if (!in array($state, $states)) {
$errorMessages[] = 'State must be one of the 50 states or DC';
}
} else {










<!−− If the request is a POST then show data −−>
<?php if ($isPost && !sizeof($errorMessages)) : ?>
<table style=”width: 400px; margin: 50px auto 0 auto;”>
<tr>
<td>Username:</td>





































<td><?php echo $state ?></td>
</tr>
</table>
<!−− Else show the form−−>
<?php else: ?>
<?php if ($errorMessages) : ?>
<ul style=”width: 400px; margin: 10px auto 0 auto; color: red;”>
<?php foreach ($errorMessages as $message) : ?>




<form action=”” id=”subscription−form” method=”post” style=”width: 400px;
margin: 10px auto 0 auto;”>
<label for=”username”>Username</label><br />
<input id=”username” name=”username” size=”16” value=”<?php echo
$username;?>”/><br /><br />
<label for=”email”>Email Address</label><br />
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<input id=”email” name=”email” size=”16” value=”<?php echo $email;?>”/><
br /><br />
<label for=”firstname”>First Name</label><br />
<input id=”firstname” name=”firstname” size=”16” value=”<?php echo
$firstName;?>”/><br /><br />
<label for=”lastname”>Last Name</label><br />
<input id=”lastname” name=”lastname” size=”16” value=”<?php echo
$lastName;?>”/><br /><br />
<label for=”age”>Age</label><br />
<input id=”age” name=”age” size=”8” value=”<?php echo $age;?>”/><br /><
br />
<label for=”address1”>Address Line 1</label><br />
<input id=”address1” name=”address1” size=”32” value=”<?php echo $address1
;?>”/><br /><br />
<label for=”address2”>Address Line 2</label><br />
<input id=”address2” name=”address2” size=”32” value=”<?php echo $address2
;?>”/><br /><br />
<label for=”city”>City</label><br />
<input id=”city” name=”city” size=”16” value=”<?php echo $city;?>”/><br
/><br />
<label for=”zipcode”>US Zipcode</label><br />




<?php foreach ($states as $state) : ?>
<option value=”<?php echo $state?>”><?php echo $state?></option>
<?php endforeach; ?>
</select><br /><br />
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